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1. Takatoshi It0 
Capital Flows in East and Southeast Asia 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The currency crises in Southeast Asia in the summer of 1997 have shown 
that even Asian “miracle” countries are not immune to the problems of volatile 
capital flows. From July to September, the four major currencies in the region 
depreciated by 20 to 30 percent, and stock prices continued declines that had 
started earlier. Although weak economies and financial sector problems are 
underlying causes of weakness, a speculative attack seems to have triggered 
the crises. A sharp exchange through the media between George Soros and 
Prime Minister Mahathir highlighted some frequently asked questions about 
the benefits and costs of free capital mobility and speculation. 
This paper reviews and analyzes capital flows to Asian countries in connec- 
tion with past growth and current pain in these economies. There is no doubt 
that capital inflows to most Asian countries accelerated their industrialization. 
Part of high economic growth was financed by foreign capital and technology. 
Capital inflows to Asian countries were considered to be managed relatively 
well in the first half of the 1990s. Even at the time of the Mexican peso crisis 
(December 1994 to 1995), “contagion” effects in Asian countries were short- 
lived and less serious. 
This chapter was written with information available up to the time of the conference, October 
1997. The crisis in East Asia, particularly in Indonesia and Korea, became much more serious. 
However, that topic needs another paper. Footnotes partially update events in Thailand. 
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In late 1996, exports from Asian countries started to slow and economic 
growth started to decelerate. The high-flying stock prices in Southeast Asian 
economies turned downward too. Since most Asian currencies were "effec- 
tively pegged" to the U.S. dollar, they were considered to have become overval- 
ued. In 1997, pressure intensified. The Thai baht came under attack in Febru- 
ary, March, and May. In July, the Thai authorities decided to float the currency. 
The Malaysian ringgit, the Indonesian rupiah, and the Philippine peso followed 
suit soon after the baht devaluation. 
Capital flows to the Asian region provide an interesting case study in eco- 
nomic development and growth. The summer 1997 episode of currency crises 
in Asia contains lessons as significant as those learned from the Mexican crisis 
of 1994-95. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1.2 gives 
a historical overview of capital flows with an emphasis on Asia. Section 3.1.3 
explains how capital flows helped economic growth in Asia. Section 3.1.4 sur- 
veys the literature on the problems associated with too much capital inflow. 
Section 3.1.5 gives a concise account of what happened in Thailand in 1997. 
Section 3.1.6 concludes. 
3.1.2 Capital Flows to Asia 
Net private capital flows to developing countries are estimated to have in- 
creased more than fivefold in the past six years. In 1990, total capital flows to 
emerging markets (developing countries and transition economies) were about 
$50 billion, of which half went to Asia and one-third to Latin America. By 
1993, total capital flows rose to $160 billion, of which slightly less than 40 per- 
cent went to Asia and slightly more than one-third to Latin America. A major- 
ity of flows to Asia took the form of direct investment and an overwhelming 
portion of flows to Latin America took the form of portfolio investment. The 
large ratio of portfolio flows to Latin American countries in 1991-93 became 
a source of instability in the wake of-if indeed it did not trigger-the Mexi- 
can peso crisis. In 1994, capital flows to Latin American countries, especially 
in the form of portfolio flows, declined compared to the preceding two years, 
while capital flows to Asia continued to increase. In particular, in 1995, net 
portfolio investment in Latin America was negative. That is, there was net out- 
flow from Latin America after the Mexican crisis. Capital flows to Latin 
America recovered sharply only in 1996, contributing to a new record high for 
the capital flows to emerging markets, exceeding $230 billion, of which about 
half went to Asia and one-third to Latin America. (For details, see table 3.1 .> 
Asian countries have in the past ten years tried to manage the rate of capital 
inflow. Technocrats and central bankers are well aware of the macroeconomic 
problems associated with too much capital inflow. However, the crisis in the 
summer of 1997 is the first test for the Asian countries of thinking in terms of 
managing capital outflow (or a decline in capital inflow). 
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Table 3.1 Net Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets (billions of 
U.S. dollars) 
Flows 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
All countries 
Total 
FDI 
Portfolio 
Others 
Asia 
Total 
FDI 
Portfolio 
Others 
La tin America 
Total 
FDI 
Portfolio 
Others 
Other regions 
Total 
FDI 
Portfolio 
Others 
Transition 
countrie5 
Total 
FDI 
Portfolio 
Others 
45.7 139.8 133.7 161.0 
18.8 32.1 35.8 56.9 
17.0 39.7 46.3 106.8 
9.9 68.0 51.7 -2.7 
21.4 37.7 22.4 59.5 
9.5 15.2 17.2 35.2 
-0.9 2.8 9.6 23.8 
12.9 19.7 -4.5 0.5 
10.3 24.9 55.5 61.7 
6.6 10.9 12.9 13.4 
17.5 14.5 30.6 61.1 
-13.8 -0.5 12.0 -12.8 
9.9 78.8 48.5 28.8 
2.7 3.7 3.7 2.3 
0.4 21.6 19.8 18.3 
6.8 54.7 25.0 8.0 
4.2 -1.6 7.1 10.9 
0.0 2.4 4.2 6.0 
0.0 0.8 -0.8 3.4 
4.2 -4.8 3.8 1.5 
147.0 
75.5 
97.2 
-25.7 
75.1 
44.6 
18.5 
12.0 
44.9 
21.5 
60.8 
-37.5 
11.6 
3.9 
15.1 
-7.5 
15.4 
5.4 
2.7 
7.3 
192.8 
87.3 
31.6 
73.9 
98.9 
50.7 
20.1 
28.1 
35.7 
19.9 
-7.5 
23.3 
28.9 
3.6 
15.7 
9.7 
29.1 
13.1 
3.4 
12.6 
235.2 
105.9 
58.7 
70.6 
106.8 
58.0 
20.1 
28.8 
77.7 
29.9 
27.1 
20.7 
31.2 
6.7 
10.0 
14.5 
19.4 
11.3 
1.6 
6.6 
Source: Folkerts-Landau et al. (1997,41). 
Note: “Others” includes short- and long-term credit, loans (not including uses of IMF credit), 
currency and deposits, and other accounts receivable and payable. “Other regions” includes the 
Middle East, Europe, and Africa. 
Even in Asia and Latin America, only a handful countries receive dispropor- 
tionately large amounts of capital inflow. From 1990 to 1995, only eight coun- 
tries have received more than $15 billion in net long-term private capital in- 
flows: China (more than $160 billion), Mexico (more than $80 billion), Brazil 
($60 billion), Korea ($50 billion), Malaysia, Argentina, Thailand, and Indo- 
nesia (World Bank 1997a, 12). The top three, China, Mexico, and Brazil, are 
relatively large countries. In ratio to GDP, Malaysia (1991-93) and Thailand 
(1989-91 and 1995) received the largest capital inflows (more than 10 percent) 
in the past several years. (For details, see table 3.2 and figs. 3.1 and 3.2.) 
Hence, relative to the sizes of their economies, some Asian countries have had 
to deal with much larger capital flow shocks than Mexico (and other Latin 
American countries). 
Table 3.2 Net Capital Inflows (percent of GDP) 
Country Period 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Cumulative 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Peru 
Venezuela 
1990-95 
1991-95 
1989-95 
1989-95 
1988-95 
1991-94 
1992-95 
1989-95 
1992-95 
1989-94 
1990-95 
1992-93 
2.5 1.9 1.3 0.2 1.1 
2.6 2.5 0.6 2.4 
2.9 5.7 11.1 15.3 23.2 1.2 
2.1 3.9 4.4 2.3 4.4 7.9 
7.4 10.4 12.3 12.3 8.6 7.7 8.3 
1.3 3.8 2.9 3.1 
2.8 2.3 1.9 
3.3 8.6 3.1 7.4 6.3 7.7 
1.8 5.6 5.6 
2.6 2.2 7.5 7.6 8.5 3.3 
3.9 5.4 5.3 4.6 10.8 
3.3 2.0 
3.6 
3.5 
6.6 
5.2 
12.1 
4.8 
4.0 
5.3 
8.2 
8.3 
9.3 
45.8 
23.1 
51.5 
9.7 
9.4 
25.8 
16.2 
27.1 
30.4 
5.4 
Source: World Bank (1997a, 175, table 4.1). 
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Country Experiences 
The high intensity of capital flow, that is, exceeding 10 percent of GDP, that 
Thailand and Malaysia experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s is truly 
remarkable. It is unparalleled among the Latin American countries, with only 
Peru reaching this volume in one year, 1994. Figures 3.1 through 3.4 show 
time series of ratios of net private capital flow to GDP for selected Asian and 
Latin American countries. 
An examination of the details in table 3.3 reveals substantial differences 
among Asian countries. China receives the lion’s share of capital flows, and 
most of them are in the form of direct investment, rather than bank credit or 
portfolio investment. Unlike other countries that attract capital inflows, China 
has recorded current account surpluses. This means China has very rapidly ac- 
cumulated foreign reserves, because roughly speaking the sum of the current ac- 
count surplus and capital inflow equals the increase in foreign reserves. These 
three aspects of the Chinese situation-that the current account is in surplus, 
that most capital inflows are in the form of direct investment, and that foreign 
reserves have been accumulated-mean that the risk of capital flow reversal is 
minimal in China. 
In other countries (discussed below) capital inflows often finance current 
account deficits. For example, from 1993 to 1996, current account deficits in- 
creased sharply in Korea. The current account went from a small surplus in 
Fig. 3.1 
to GDP 
Source: World Bank (1997b). 
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Fig. 3.2 Philippines and Thailand: ratio of net private capital flow to GDP 
Source; World Bank (1997b). 
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Fig. 3.3 Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: ratio of net private capital flow to GDP 
Source: World Bank (1997b). 
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Fig. 3.4 Colombia, Mexico, and Peru: ratio of net private capital flow to GDP 
Source: World Bank (1997b). 
1993 to -5 percent of GDP in 1996. Capital inflows to Korea increased ac- 
cordingly, most flows taking the form of bank credit. 
Thailand has maintained relatively high current account deficits. Capital in- 
flows have also been high and, up to 1996, more than offset the deficits, re- 
sulting in a steady increase in foreign reserves. Most capital inflows to Thai- 
land took the form of bank credit, as in Korea. In fact, in 1993 Thailand opened 
an international offshore banking facility (Bangkok International Banking Fa- 
cility), which became an intermediate point through which foreign banks could 
move funds into Thai domestic markets. This resulted in a threefold increase 
in bank credit inflows between 1993 and 1994. The size and characteristics of 
the capital inflows described here will be an important part of the backdrop to 
the baht crisis of 1997, described below. 
Malaysia has also used capital inflows to finance current account deficits. 
However, the current account deficit in Malaysia is smaller than in Thailand, 
though larger than in Korea. The portion of bank credit in capital flows to Ma- 
laysia is much less than that to Korea and Thailand. Equity investment in Ma- 
laysia has been larger, probably because of its deep capital market (the ratio of 
stock market capitalization to GDP in Malaysia is the highest in the world), 
which attracts foreign equity investors. 
Indonesia and the Philippines have also attracted increasing capital flows, 
though their size (in ratio to GDP) has not reached the level that Malaysia and 
Thailand experienced earlier. Both Indonesia and the Philippines have experi- 
enced modest current account deficits. Traditionally, both Indonesia and the 
Table 3.3 'Qpe of Private Capital Flow (millions of U.S. dollars) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Asia 
China 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
Indonesia 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
Korea 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
Malaysia 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
Philippines 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
Thailand 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
469,003 
6,401 
-250 
7,922 
4,008 
139,116 
-2,780 
6,129 
1,947 
663 
307,938 
-3,944 
6,994 
2,057 
3,806 
58,310 
-2,167 
8,746 
5,439 
2,001 
52,976 
- 1,000 
3,208 
268 
302 
11 1,453 
-6,303 
9,475 
1,538 
4,630 
598,765 
-11,609 
23,474 
24,266 
2,146 
158,007 
-2,106 
5,632 
2,692 
1,573 
332,821 
990 
3,217 
5,659 
1,782 
64,180 
- 2,99 1 
10,805 
11,664 
4,518 
54,368 
-3,016 
3,267 
8 12 
-2,843 
125,575 
-6,364 
10,500 
4,337 
3,964 
546,610 
6,908 
32,645 
34,208 
3,786 
176,892 
-2,792 
3,839 
2,573 
2,030 
380,822 
-3,867 
10,733 
1,580 
15,314 
72,506 
-4,520 
1,288 
8,986 
-2,924 
64,084 
-2,950 
5,120 
1,558 
115 
144,525 
-8,085 
12,167 
259 
1 1,490 
711,315 
1,618 
38,674 
36,185 
8,405 
202.13 1 
-6,431 
10,259 
4,285 
8,021 
456,356 
-8,507 
17,273 
2,205 
24,351 
87,315 
-8,469 
7,639 
4,604 
1,472 
74,120 
- 1,980 
5,309 
1,609 
1,513 
168,355 
-13,554 
2 1,909 
3,238 
17,828 
834.3 11 
7,243 
39,966 
39,981 
10,625 
227,370 
-7,663 
10,847 
5,195 
12,602 
484,569 
-23,006 
23,924 
2,956 
35,119 
99,169 
-4,596 
9,479 
5,361 
4,159 
82,847 
-3,953 
11,277 
3,517 
3,875 
185,047 
- 14,692 
19,486 
2,718 
9,531 
Latin America 
Argentina 
GDP 228,990 257,842 281,925 279,613 297,460 
Current account -5,462 -7,672 -10,117 -2,768 -3,787 
Capital inflows 7,373 9,827 9,279 574 7,033 
Equity 4,630 4,038 3,954 4,589 7,375 
Bank credits 1,152 9,945 1,139 2,587 959 
Table 3.3 (continued) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Latin America 
Brazil 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
Chile 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
Colombia 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
Mexico 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
Peru 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
Venezuela 
GDP 
Current account 
Capital inflows 
Equity 
Bank credits 
446,580 
6,089 
5,889 
3,147 
1 1,077 
41,882 
-958 
3,134 
876 
2,192 
44,140 
90 1 
183 
744 
813 
363,608 
- 24,442 
27,039 
10,149 
4,643 
41,739 
-2,116 
45 1 
136 
386 
60,422.69 
-3,749 
3,386 
644 
1,370 
438,300 
20 
7,604 
4,062 
4,375 
44,474 
-2,554 
2,996 
1,326 
804 
50,863 
-2,102 
2,701 
913 
1,453 
403,194 
-23,400 
33,760 
15,104 
2,246 
-41,186 
-2,327 
-259 
892 
77 
60,047.78 
- 1,993 
2,656 
-446 
501 
546,230 
-1,153 
8,020 
5,333 
9,162 
50,920 
- 1,585 
5,294 
2,580 
1,108 
68,631 
-3,160 
2,770 
1,532 
1,483 
421,721 
-29,662 
15,787 
15,056 
3,166 
-50,287 
-2,667 
3,320 
3,644 
775 
58,417.47 
2,541 
-3,203 
740 
- 500 
704,167 
-18,136 
29,306 
8,169 
11,443 
65,215 
- 1,398 
2,488 
1,959 
1,100 
80,53 1 
-4,365 
4,485 
1,384 
2,503 
286,697 
- 1,576 
- 10,487 
10,045 
-58 
-59,129 
-4,314 
2,308 
2,354 
1,515 
77,389.42 
2,014 
-2,964 
1,064 
- 625 
774,868 
-23,602 
33,984 
15,788 
14,462 
69,218 
-3,744 
6,781 
4,090 
1,808 
86,355 
7,098 
3,416 
3,564 
330,044 
-2,330 
6,133 
11,986 
-4,946 
-396 
-61,002 
-3,619 
3,097 
3,942 
459 
70,537.85 
8,914 
-1,784 
2,800 
-740 
Sources: GDP is nominal GDP converted into U.S. dollars at the annual average exchange rate 
and current account is current account surplus (negative means deficit); from IMF, Znternational 
Financial Statistics CD-ROM (Washington, D.C., March 1999). 
Capital inflows are net private capital inflows, equity is net equity investment including direct 
equity investment and portfolio equity investment, and bank creht is commercial bank, net credit 
flows; from Institute of International Finance, Comparative Statisticsfor Emerging Market Econo- 
mies (Washington, D.C., December 1998). 
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Philippines have not relied on bank credit, but Indonesia recently received an 
increased level of bank credit. 
Among Latin American countries, the ratio of capital inflow to GDP was 
highest in Mexico, before the peso crisis, and has recently become highest in 
Peru. However, the average level of this ratio among Latin American countries 
is lower than among Asian emerging market countries. The reason Asian coun- 
tries did not experience a currency crisis or volatile capital outflows until 1997 
is that growth rates were much higher there than in Latin America. When the 
growth rate is high, the future ratio of external liability to GDP is expected to 
be “sustainable.” (See Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 1996 for the literature on cur- 
rent account sustainability.) For example, Mexico got into trouble when its cur- 
rent account deficit reached 8 percent with an economic growth rate of 3.5 per- 
cent in 1994, while Thailand with the same current account deficit ratio had no 
crisis in 1995 and 1996, when the Thai economic growth rates were 8.6 and 
6.7 percent, respectively. Only when the growth rate declined sharply in 1997 
did pressure on the baht become unavoidable. 
Bank Credit 
Since bank lending plays a large role in many countries in Asia, and to a 
lesser extent in Latin America, a more careful look at the nature and source of 
bank lending is necessary. According to Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) data, as of the end of 1996, Asia in total had borrowed $367 billion from 
abroad (in all currencies and locally in foreign currencies; for details, see table 
3.4, panel A). Latin American countries had borrowed $244 billion from 
abroad. Korea’s cross-border liability amounted to $100 billion, while Thai- 
land‘s reached $70 billion. Among Latin American countries, Brazil with $68 
billion and Mexico with $6 1 billion were the largest. Both China and Indonesia 
in Asia had external bank liabilities of almost $56 billion, and Argentina had 
$45 billion in external bank liability. 
Bank liability is important because currency crises are often associated with 
banking crises (as forcefully argued by Kaminsky and Reinhart 1996). Causal- 
ity can go either way. The banking sector, which performs a clearing and settle- 
ment function for all transactions, is a key financial sector, so the government 
has to step in if a banking crisis develops. With a weak and vulnerable banking 
sector, a strong currency defense is impossible. Hence, the higher the ratio of 
external liability in the banking system, the more vulnerable is the banking 
system once a crisis develops. A banking crisis then results in a currency crisis 
as foreign investors withdraw funds. If the currency depreciates sharply, exter- 
nal liabilities, especially those denominated in foreign currencies, become a 
much larger burden. Hence, a currency crisis will develop into a banking crisis 
if external liability in the banking sector is unusually high. Put simply, the 
Mexican peso crisis caused a banking crisis in the subsequent months, while 
the Thai baht crisis was preceded by a banking crisis (to be precise, it was a 
financial market crisis, because the troubled institutions were not banks but 
finance companies). 
Table 3.4 International Bank Lending: International Positions of All Reporting Banks on 
Countries outside the Reporting Area, End of December 1996 (millions of 
US. dollars) 
A. By Maturity and Sector 
Sector 
Maturity of 
One Year Nonbank 
Claims Vis-i-Vis Total or Less Bank Public private 
Developing countries 692,563 398,757 252,590 118,880 319,756 
Asia 367,056 225,710 158,885 33,141 174,588 
China 55,002 26,879 22,797 8,476 23,725 
Indonesia 55,523 34,248 11,788 6,942 36,759 
Korea 99,953 67,506 65,896 5,677 28,310 
Malaysia 22,231 11,191 6,510 1,993 13,722 
Philippines 13,289 7,737 5,246 2,723 5,319 
Taiwan 22,363 18,869 12,924 475 8,955 
Thailand 70,181 45,704 25.906 2,276 41.854 
Latin America 243.608 131,320 59,934 67,533 115,639 
Argentina 44,819 25,215 8,192 10,578 25,440 
Brazil 67,954 42,835 20,978 17,849 29,102 
Chile 15,155 7,762 3,701 1,689 9,765 
Colombia 16,772 6,590 4,015 3,705 9,052 
Mexico 61,335 28,080 12,953 22,305 26,069 
Venezuela 11,082 3,150 796 5,654 4,627 
offshore banking centers 663,897 493,152 402,647 3,967 255,697 
Hong Kong 207,164 170,867 135,474 1,084 70,020 
Singapore 189,310 175,303 156,938 440 3 1,765 
Memorandum item for 
B. By Source Country: Japan and the United States 
Claims Vis-i-Vis Total Japan United States 
Developing countries 
Asia 
China 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Latin America 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
offshore banking centers 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
Memorandum item for 
692,563 
367,056 
55,002 
55,523 
99,953 
22,231 
13,289 
22,363 
70,181 
243,608 
44,819 
67,954 
15,155 
16,772 
61,335 
11.082 
663,897 
207,164 
189,310 
138,317 
118,576 
17,792 
22,035 
24,324 
8,210 
1,558 
2,683 
37,525 
15,399 
1,789 
5,171 
794 
1,310 
5,360 
1.694 
219,690 
87,462 
58,809 
106,468 
34,241 
2,688 
5,279 
9,355 
2,337 
3,902 
3,182 
5,049 
66,461 
13,242 
18,443 
4,228 
4,125 
17,426 
2,834 
35,617 
8,665 
5,727 
Sources: Bank for International Settlements, “The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of Intema- 
tional Bank Lending, Second Half 1996’ (Basel, June 1997). 
Nofe: Table reports consolidated cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in nonlocal currencies. 
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The statistics also reveal that the public sector in Asian countries did not 
borrow much from foreign banks. Most cross-border borrowing went to either 
the domestic banking or nonbank private sector. Out of the $367 billion that 
Asian countries borrowed from abroad, only 10 percent went to the public 
sector. In contrast, one-fourth of the $243 billion that Latin American countries 
borrowed went to the public sector. Mexico has an external liability of $61 
billion from abroad, of which one-third is owed by the public sector. In sum, 
Asian countries, most notably Korea and Thailand, relied on cross-border bank 
credit more than their Latin American counterparts. The domestic banking and 
nonbank private sectors were the major borrowers in Asia, while the public sec- 
tor was also a substantial borrower in some Latin American countries. 
In the BIS statistics on cross-border bank credit, it is also possible to trace 
the origin (lender) of funds (see table 3.4, panel B). For Asian and LatinAmeri- 
can countries, substantial lending came either from Japan or the United States. 
Of the Asian liability of $693 billion owed to international banks, Japanese 
banks have lent $138 billion and U.S. banks $106 billion. In Latin America, 
U.S. banks have lent $66 billion, one-fourth of the total Latin American liabil- 
ity of $243 billion. Japanese banks lent only $15 billion to Latin American 
countries. Among Asian countries, Thailand is notable: of its $70 billion exter- 
nal liability to international banks, Japanese banks account for $38 billion, or 
more than half. No other major Asian or Latin American country has borrowed 
more than half its debt from the banks of a single country. This fact partly ex- 
plains why Thai authorities particularly asked Japanese banks to keep the line 
of credit open during the baht crisis. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is often said to be a preferred form of invest- 
ment for host countries. (Direct investment is usually defined as the purchase 
of more than 10 percent of the equity of a particular company.) Compared with 
bank credit, bank deposits, or bonds, it is more difficult and costly to withdraw 
investment that has become factories and other real assets. Moreover, with di- 
rect investment comes foreign management and technological transfers, which 
are expected to contribute to raising the industrialization level of the host coun- 
try. In the beginning of the 1990s, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia were the 
favored destinations of Japanese FDI. On average Indonesia has received more 
than 150 billion yen (about $1.3 billion) annually in the 1990s. By the mid- 
1990s, China had become the top host of Japanese FDI. In 1995, China re- 
ceived more than 430 billion yen (about $4 billion) of Japanese FDI. 
Japanese FDI flows to Latin American countries were much smaller than 
those to Asian countries. Only Brazil has received more Japanese FDI than 
some Asian countries, such as the Philippines and Korea, in the 1990s (for de- 
tails, see table 3.5). 
Japanese FDI, mostly for the assembly of finished products, in Asia has 
stimulated industrialization. However, factories built by Japanese FDI continue 
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Table 3.5 Flow of Foreign Direct Investment from Japan (billions of yen) 
Average for 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1990-95 
Asia 
China 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Latin America 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
50.1 78.7 138.1 195.4 268.3 431.9 
161.5 162.8 214.2 95.2 180.8 154.8 
41.9 35.7 29.1 28.9 42.0 43.3 
106.7 120.2 91.9 89.2 77.2 55.5 
38.3 27.7 21.0 23.6 68.3 69.2 
65.3 55.4 37.6 34.3 29.2 43.9 
169.6 110.7 84.9 68.0 74.9 119.6 
30.4 5.5 2.4 3.9 2.1 11.0 
89.2 23.5 60.6 49.2 130.8 28.7 
4.3 10.2 3.5 0.4 1.4 13.6 
8.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.1 
24.8 26.1 7.8 6.1 65.1 20.2 
11.3 13.8 3.2 2.3 0.6 2.7 
193.75 
161.55 
36.82 
90.12 
41.35 
44.28 
104.62 
9.22 
63.67 
5.57 
2.32 
25.02 
5.65 
Source: Japan, Ministry of Finance, Annual Report of the Znternational Finance, 1996 (Tokyo: 
Kinyu Zaisei Jijo Kenkyukai, 1997), 436-37. 
Note: FDI from Japan in these statistics is on the “reporting basis” of cross-border investment. It 
may not match actual disbursement because some reported investment may be canceled, and some 
will be carried out without reporting (no penalty). New FDI financed locally or reinvestment from 
past FDI is not covered by these statistics. 
to require imports of parts and semifinished goods from Japan. Domestic pro- 
duction of parts has become a challenge for Asian countries that have recorded 
large trade deficits against Japan. (An exception is Indonesia, which records 
surpluses against Japan.) 
3.1.3 Capital Flows and Economic Growth: Virtuous Circle 
Until the Thai baht crisis of 1997, no one questioned that capital flows to 
Asian countries have contributed to accelerating economic growth. As the 
economies grew and industrialization proceeded, the funds needed to build 
more factories became larger every year. As domestic saving lagged behind 
high investment, capital inflows were used to fund investment. Unlike in Latin 
America, where capital inflows were often fueling a consumption boom, Asian 
capital inflows were either directly building factories (as in the case of “green 
field” FDI) or intermediated by the banking system to materialize in fixed in- 
vestment. 
Although Japan, Taiwan, and, to a lesser extent, Korea achieved their indus- 
trialization and high economic growth without foreign capital, the ASEAN 
countries-Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia-relied heavily on 
foreign capital at least at the beginning stage of industrialization in the 1980s. 
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In the 1990s, China became a large importer of foreign capital. The authorities 
of these countries were keen on selecting industries for their economic devel- 
opment. 
In the past fifty years, Japan has upgraded its industries from textiles to con- 
sumer durables, to heavy and chemical industries, to automobiles, and to high- 
tech products. Korea and Taiwan seem to be following a similar industrializa- 
tion path, a few decades later. And the ASEAN countries are chasing Korea 
and Taiwan up the industrialization ladder, while themselves being chased by 
China and Vietnam. This pattern of staggered industrialization by the Asian 
economies is often nicknamed the “flying geese pattern” (see Ito 1996, 1997b 
for the concept and earlier literature of this pattern). Capital flows play an 
important role in this pattern of economic development. As some industries, 
say textiles, lose competitiveness as the result of wage hikes in one country, say 
Korea, a company will seek to move its factories to a lower wage country, say 
Thailand. If management skills are transferable to different countries, this will 
accelerate the industrialization process of the host country. The host country 
will develop its own industries as skilled workers and middle-level manage- 
ment become available through training at the foreign firms on domestic soil. 
Technological transfer has to occur sooner or later. Korea and Taiwan have 
already become capital exporters. 
This explanation also points out that capital flows in Asia are related to trade. 
In some cases, exports are replaced by FDI, and in other cases, foreign invest- 
ment is followed by more trade. Initially, parts and semifinished goods have to 
be imported by a host country, until they become available domestically, and 
then exports from the host country will increase as the firms become success- 
ful. This process took place in many industries in many countries in Asia. 
3.1.4 The Problem of Too Much Capital Flow 
Although capital inflows are essentially beneficial to a host country, emerg- 
ing market countries sometimes face what the authorities consider “too much” 
capital inflow. Malaysia faced capital inflows that amounted to more than 10 
percent of GDP in 1991, more than 15 percent of GDP in 1992, and more than 
20 percent of GDP in 1993. Thailand also attracted capital flows that exceeded 
10 percent of GDP in 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1995. In Latin America, Chile, 
Mexico, and Peru experienced capital inflows that exceeded 6 percent of GDP 
in the past decade. Capital inflows of this magnitude are difficult to manage 
(Khan and Reinhart 1995; Folkerts-Landau and Ito 1995, chap. 4). 
Doing nothing in the face of large capital inflows will certainly appreciate 
the currency sharply. That will force some export industries out of business. 
Once an industry is lost, even if the exchange rate depreciates to the earlier 
level, production and exports of the industry may not recover. Because many 
industries require fixed investment, volatility in the exchange rate has an ad- 
verse effect on exports. Hence, unless the current account is in surplus, which 
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is unlikely for most emerging market countries, the first macroeconomic re- 
sponse to large capital inflows is usually to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market to prevent a sharp nominal appreciation of the currency. If the exchange 
rate regime is de facto fixed, then intervention is not a choice but a must. For- 
eign reserves will increase as a result of intervention to keep the nominal ex- 
change rate from appreciating too much. Foreign exchange intervention will 
increase the domestic monetary base. There then are two choices: the increase 
in monetary base can be offset by domestic open market operations (sterilized 
intervention), or the increase can be left alone (unsterilized intervention). 
Suppose the case of unsterilized intervention. Unless an increase in money 
demand, which is sometimes observed in a rapidly growing economy, absorbs 
the increase in the monetary base, the result will be lower interest rates, over- 
heating, and inflation. These are undesirable consequences. Suppose the case 
of sterilized intervention. It can reduce the risk of inflation, but it may lead to 
even larger capital flows. In order to see this, suppose that the initial surge in 
capital inflows takes the form of FDI and equity investment. Then one-to-one 
sterilization will likely increase the short-term interest rate (as opposed to 
keeping the same rate). This leads to an increase in short-term capital inflows, 
such as investment in interbank deposits, interbank lending, and short-term 
securities. From the viewpoint of a host country, capital inflows in short-term 
instruments are less desirable than FDI or equity investment. In fact, sterilized 
intervention may adversely change the composition of capital inflows. 
If intervention, sterilized or not, is not a cure-all, what other options or com- 
binations of options does the host country have? If overheating ( e g ,  as a result 
of unsterilized intervention) is a problem, the period of capital inflows provides 
an excellent opportunity for tightening fiscal expenditure. Thailand succeeded 
in reducing fiscal deficits during the 1989-91 period of large capital inflows. 
Emerging market countries tend to have current account deficits caused by im- 
ports of capital goods, and surges in capital inflows tend to worsen these gaps. 
In order to prevent current account deficits from increasing, domestic saving 
has to be promoted. Tax incentives for saving, or some more direct measure 
(introducing a compulsory pension plan), can help to prevent further deteriora- 
tion in current account deficits. 
If all these options are exhausted and capital inflows are still substantial, 
capital controls, a more controversial option, may be used. Capital inflows in 
short-term instruments can be discouraged by reserve requirements on bank 
deposits by nonresidents, a withholding tax on interest from bank deposits and 
short-term securities, or an outright ban on sales of short-term instruments to 
nonresidents. Reserve requirements on deposits by nonresidents and especially 
on those denominated in foreign currency can be justified as a part of pruden- 
tial policy rather than foreign exchange capital controls. When capital flows 
are volatile and exchange rate risk rises, bank risk management has to be en- 
hanced. 
A tricky part of introducing capital controls is that the host country does not 
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want to discourage long-term capital inflows or lose the confidence of investors 
in the long run. Changes in capital controls should be transparent and fair. It 
would be better to slow a liberalization process rather than eliminate capital 
control measures once and then reintroduce them. Capital controls, if imple- 
mented without loopholes, will make it possible for a host country to induce a 
shift in the composition of capital flows to more long-term instruments and will 
allow the monetary authorities to use the short-term interest rate for domestic 
purposes, such as keeping inflation in check. 
Several Asian and Latin American countries have implemented capital con- 
trols. For example, in 1991-92 Chile introduced a withholding tax on borrow- 
ing from abroad; Brazil in 1994 introduced a tax on foreign investment in the 
stock market; Malaysia introduced a ban on the sale of short-term instruments 
to nonresidents in January-August 1994, and banks were required to place re- 
serves at the central bank. Both Malaysia and Thailand maintained restrictions 
on the open foreign currency positions of banks (see Folkerts-Landau and Ito 
1995, chap. 5;  Dooley 1996). 
3.1.5 The Baht Crisis of 1997 
Economic growth in Thailand starting in the late 1980s has been one of the 
miracles of Southeast Asia. After staying at or above 10 percent from 1988 to 
1990, the growth rate has been stable at 8 to 9 percent in the 1990s. However, 
in 1996 Thailand fell into a (growth) “recession,” and the growth rate declined 
below 7 percent, a decline that continued in 1997. One of the reasons for this 
was a decline in export growth. The twelve-month export growth rate had be- 
come zero by the beginning of 1997. Suddenly, the engine of growth, namely 
exports, stalled, and several structural weaknesses in the economy became ex- 
posed. Since large current account deficits, 8 percent of GDP, were financed 
by capital inflows, a lower economic growth rate posed the question of sus- 
tainability. A high growth rate means that a country may be able to grow out 
of debt (in ratio to GDP), while a low growth rate means that debt (in ratio to 
GDP) will accumulate quickly. The difference in economic growth rate affects 
confidence among investors, even if the ratio of the current account deficit to 
GDP is the same. 
Overvalued Currency 
One of the reasons for the export slowdown was overvaluation of the cur- 
rency. The Thai baht was under the basket system. However, an overwhelming 
weight was placed on the U.S. dollar. Thus it was de facto pegged to the U.S. 
dollar. The situation was similar in Malaysia and Indonesia. When the U.S. 
dollar depreciates against the Japanese yen (as when the yen went to 80 per 
dollar in April 1995), Southeast Asian goods sell well in the United States and 
Japan. However, when the dollar appreciates (as between April 1995 and late 
1996, when the yen went from 80 to 125 per dollar), the price competitiveness 
of Southeast Asian exports is lost. 
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Since all of these countries have a significant trade relationship with Japan, 
and some Asian countries have products that compete directly with Japanese 
products in global (mostly U.S.) markets, fluctuation in the yen-dollar ex- 
change rate affects their trade accounts. When the yen appreciated in the first 
half of the 1990s (from the 120s in 1993-94 to the peak at 80 yen per dollar 
in April 1995), these countries enjoyed a boom in exports. However, the subse- 
quent depreciation of the yen (back to the 120s in 1995-96) sent the exports 
of these economies into a tailspin. 
Japan accounts for one-third of total imports to Thailand. Most imports from 
Japan are in the category of parts and semifinished products. The goods then 
manufactured and assembled are exported mostly to the United States (ac- 
counting for 20 percent), Japan (1 5 percent), and other Asian countries (30 to 
40 percent). Malaysia has a similar import and export structure. For Indonesia, 
Japan is the most important export destination (25 percent) as well as import 
origin (25 percent). Therefore, the dollar peg has gradually lost its justification 
for these countries. During the period of yen appreciation, the dollar peg served 
these countries well by providing gradual depreciation for export competitive- 
ness. However, recent large fluctuations of the yen put these countries in an 
awkward position. 
Another factor that indicates the strong linkage of the Asian economies to 
Japan as well as the United States is the ratio of yen invoicing in Japanese ex- 
ports to and imports from East Asian countries. According to Ministry of Inter- 
national Trade and Industry statistics, the yen invoice ratio for Japanese exports 
to the region increased from 30 percent in 198 1 to more than 50 percent at the 
beginning of the 1990s; the yen invoice ratio for Japanese imports from the 
region increased from 2 percent in 1983 to more than 25 percent in 1993. 
When prices are quoted in yen, while currencies are pegged to the dollar, fluc- 
tuation in the yen-dollar rate directly affects the trade accounts of these econ- 
omies. 
Property Sector Problems 
The slowdown in economic growth was accompanied by the bursting of the 
real estate bubble. Some bank credit, which had increased in 1994, went to 
the real estate sector. Office buildings were overbuilt. As the financial bubble 
collapsed, stock prices and real estate prices declined sharply, and nonper- 
forming loans increased. Finance companies (nonbank financial institutions 
lending heavily to the real estate sector) were particularly hard hit. In the spring 
of 1997, the Bank of Thailand had to start providing liquidity support to the 
troubled finance companies because funds started to flee institutions that were 
perceived to be weak. The earlier collapse of the Bangkok Bank of Commerce 
(eventually taken over by the government) created a background of pessimism 
about financial institutions. The central bank extended loans to finance compa- 
nies through the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF), which is 
vaguely similar to a deposit insurance system. By the time these finance com- 
panies were suspended (sixteen in June and another forty-two in August), 430 
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billion baht had been lent. These financial troubles weakened the confidence 
of foreign investors in the economy and the currency. As discussed in section 
3.1.2, Thailand had large inflows to its banking sector. Hence the loss of con- 
fidence in the financial system among foreign investors had a much larger ef- 
fect on capital flows and on the economy in general than would otherwise have 
been the case. 
In order to alleviate the problem of nonperfonning property loans, the Thai 
authorities set up the Property Loan Management Organization (PLMO) in the 
spring of 1997 to help restructure such loans. However, the operational details 
of the PLMO are still under discussion, and it is unclear to what extent the 
PLMO will be beneficial to developers and financial institutions. Open, trans- 
parent pricing of properties to be bought by the PLMO is crucial.’ 
Speculative Attack 
When the banking sector is in trouble, the currency becomes vulnerable. 
The interest defense (increasing the interest rate in the hopes of stopping capi- 
tal outflows or even attracting inflows) cannot be deployed when financial insti- 
tutions are beset with large portfolios of nonperforming loans. Capital flight 
becomes a serious concern. Precisely at this moment, the probability of success 
in a speculative attack increases. 
A massive attack on the baht took place in mid-May 1997.* Baht selling took 
place in the spot market and also in the forward market in the form of swap 
arrangements. Speculators hoped to cause devaluation by selling short the 
baht. When this strategy was countered by intervention, and the spot rate held, 
speculators went to sell the baht forward, through swap arrangements. The 
swap arrangements that speculators engaged in were essentially contracting to 
sell baht forward at the same time that they were buying baht in the spot market 
(probably squaring the position of earlier short selling in the spot market). 
When the central bank becomes a counterparty in swap deals, it is able to ac- 
quire dollars on the balance sheet (as a result of the spot transaction, the first 
leg of the swap arrangement) while having dollar liabilities off the balance 
sheet. The fact that the foreign reserve level changed little from May to June 
means that the central bank countered spot selling of the baht by intervening 
in the market, while engaging in swap arrangements similar in magnitude. Had 
the future liabilities of dollar selling (buying baht) been consolidated, the true 
foreign reserve level at the end of May would have revealed a substantial de- 
cline. At that point, keeping the de facto fixed rate would have become impos- 
sible. The Thai authorities must have hoped for some event that would allow 
1. The resolution of bad debt needed a very radical solution in the end. Of the fifty-eight sus- 
pended finance companies, fifty-six were closed in December 1997. Assets from these companies 
were sold to the public in several auctions in 1998. See Ito (1998) for updates on the events 
in Thailand. 
2. See Nukul Commission (1998) for exactly what happened during the speculative attack of 
May 1997. 
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the central bank to regain a comfortable level of foreign reserves before the 
forward liabilities became due, but no such event took place. Although the cen- 
tral bank managed to keep the fixed rate until 2 July, the game had been over 
by the end of May. 
Market participants knew the fact that the central bank had engaged in the 
swap arrangements, but they did not have precise information on the size of 
the swaps in which the central bank had engaged. It was revealed in August 
(as part of the IMF loan conditions) that the Bank of Thailand had forward 
liabilities of more than $23 billion (about two-thirds of its foreign reserves). It 
was a shock to most market participants. 
“Mai Thai“ Hangover 
In the aftermath of the Mexican crisis of December 1994, pressures on cur- 
rencies and stock prices spread to other Latin American countries and even 
some Asian countries. Indeed, the “tequila effect” was felt as far away as Thai- 
land in January 1995. In 1997 it was Thailand‘s turn to be at the epicenter of a 
shock, and effects on the region’s other currencies-the Philippine peso, the 
Korean won, the Malaysian ringgit, and the Indonesian rupiah-have been 
considerable. All, including the Thai baht, are continuing to fall through Sep- 
tember. I call this state of affairs the “Mai Thai“ hangover (after the Mai Tai, a 
popular cocktail in Bangk~k) .~  
Stock prices are also falling in these countries. Even Hong Kong, where 
the currency board arrangement fortifies the already strong financial system, 
experienced speculative attacks, and an interest rate hike intended to defend 
the currency triggered a sharp stock price decline. 
The episode poses several questions: Why did the IMF rescue package fail 
to halt the decline in exchange rates and stock prices in Thailand and beyond? 
Are there similar fundamental conditions in the Southeast Asian economies 
that contributed to the spillover? What should be done in the region to prevent 
such crises in the future? 
The IMF decided to offer $4 billion under a standby arrangement, and the 
Asian countries led by Japan contributed an additional $10 billion. The total 
package, including pledges from the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank, amounted to $16.7 billion by the time the IMF plan had been approved 
by its board. The amount was considered to be more than enough to offset 
the drain of foreign reserves expected to result from the Bank of Thailand‘s 
unwinding of its forward positions. The hope was that halting the slide of the 
baht would make the crisis less contagious, thereby restoring confidence in the 
region as a whole. The intended effect did not, however, materialize. 
The IMF package was not immediately effective for two reasons. First, as 
part of the IMF standby agreement, the Bank of Thailand announced a larger 
than expected volume of forward contracts (or maximum size of foreign re- 
3. This section draws heavily on It0 (1997a). 
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serve losses), causing the baht to slide further. The market reaction may not be 
fully justified, since some of the forward exposures (especially onshore con- 
tracts) were the result of providing baht to the market through swap agree- 
ments-just like government bond repurchase agreements-as a part of do- 
mestic open market operations. However, this point was too subtle to calm the 
market. The wisdom of “full” disclosure in this case is open to question. 
Second, the IMF package did not directly address the problems in Thailand‘s 
financial sector. The balance sheets of many financial institutions, in particu- 
lar finance companies, were damaged by declining property values. The mone- 
tary authorities in Thailand had taken several measures before the IMF pack- 
age: the PLMO was created to buy nonperforming loans, and the worst finance 
companies, sixteen of them, were suspended in June, and an additional forty- 
two were suspended in August. However, the market apparently did not take 
comfort from the actions, partly because it was not clear at that point whether 
the merger or liquidation of these institutions would require any fiscal expendi- 
ture and whether the liquidity support to these institutions provided by the 
FIDF could be paid back in full. The market did not like the uncertainty about 
the fate of these institutions and its possible impact on fiscal positions in the 
future. 
The Mai Thai hangover seems to have been more widespread, prolonged, 
and damaging (having forced countries to abandon their pegs) than the tequila 
effect. (To be fair, though, it took a month or two after the IMF package for 
Mexico was announced to stabilize Mexican financial markets.) General spill- 
over of the Thai baht crisis to other currencies certainly suggests a common 
root of the problems. The region’s economic structures may be so similar that 
one external shock rocks all countries. The yen-dollar exchange rate is a prime 
suspect for the external shock. All of the currencies of the emerging markets 
in the region were effectively pegged to the U.S. dollar. Even those countries 
that had basket systems, such as Thailand, put an overwhelming weight on the 
U.S. dollar in the basket. (Singapore was known to have put a relatively heavy 
weight on the Japanese yen.) As discussed earlier, the dollar peg, with yen- 
dollar fluctuation, led to weak export performance. 
With the “big bang” of the Japanese financial markets, competition for fi- 
nancial business in Asia will become fierce. Now that Japan is awakening and 
will make a move, financial markets in the region will become more liberalized 
and efficient. Low interest rates in Japan are making Japanese investors seek 
opportunities outside. Capital flows are not scarce, despite the turmoil in the 
currency and stock markets in the region. In a sense, the current crisis is man- 
ageable in an environment where interest rates are low and liquidity is ample. 
The integration of financial markets will proceed. But danger may come the 
next time Japan raises interest rates. Its effect will be much more strongly felt 
in the region than before, because financial markets will be more integrated 
than before. Markets in the region have to prepare for an eventual rise in yen 
interest rates. once the current turmoil is over. 
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The simultaneous depreciation of the currencies in the region looks like a 
competitive devaluation. With the baht, Philippine peso, and ringgit depreciat- 
ing, the rupiah has no choice but to depreciate in order to maintain its competi- 
tiveness. All this suggests that the monetary authorities of these countries may 
be well advised to consider pegging their currencies, with a wide band, to 
similar baskets-if not the common basket-in which the yen and euro are 
heavily weighted. 
Given that these Southeast Asian economies have been integrated with the 
Japanese manufacturing and financial sectors, as well as with the U.S. econ- 
omy and financial markets, the weights in the baskets to which their currencies 
are pegged should have been revised some time ago. Announcements and press 
releases from the IMF claim credit for having recommended “flexibility” in 
exchange rates well before the crisis. However, the IMF has not shown a safe 
way to exit from the peg. “Exit policy” has become a hot issue in discussions 
of exchange rate policy for emerging markets. 
Both the Mexican and Thai crises teach the lesson that the financial sector 
(especially banks) is important in managing the economy. Banks in Thailand 
had borrowed short-term funds through an offshore facility and then lent to do- 
mestic industries. Some funds went to property markets, which had been boom- 
ing. The bursting of the property bubble made these loans nonperfonning, and 
then depreciation of the baht further troubled those institutions that had bor- 
rowed in dollars. 
This compares, on one side, to the Mexican Tesobono problem and, on the 
other side, to the Mexican banks that suffered losses from the peso deprecia- 
tion and subsequent recession. Tesobonos made it possible for Mexico to con- 
tinue financing large current account deficits, while short-term bank loans 
played a similar role in Thailand. Thailand argued before asking for the IMF 
loan that Thai obligations were in the private sector, unlike the sovereign debt 
(Tesobonos) of Mexico. However, when the banking system is at risk, the gov- 
ernment has to step in. Indeed, the Thai government had to guarantee the de- 
positors (holders of promissory notes) of all suspended finance companies and 
even the creditors of the forty-two finance companies that were suspended in 
August in order to prevent a run on the remaining finance companies and 
banks. It might not make any difference in the end whether the “overborrow- 
ing” occurred in the private banking sector or the government sector. As with 
the Tesobonos, most creditors were bailed out in Thailand. International finan- 
cial communities have not found a way to prevent moral hazard among inter- 
national creditors (holders of Tesobonos and creditors of finance companies). 
3.1.6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper described the size and types of capital flows to Asia and analyzed 
their impact on the Asian economies. Capital flows bring both benefits and risk 
to a host country. Appropriate macroeconomic responses to manage the size 
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and composition of capital flows are crucial. Domestic financial markets have 
to be deep and robust in order to minimize the risk from volatile capital flows. 
In particular, the banking system is crucial to keeping the economy away from 
a chaotic recession in the wake of currency turmoil. The Thai baht crisis proves 
that even Asian miracle economies can suffer the kinds of financial crises that 
have occurred in Latin America. Understanding the mechanism behind such 
crises and developing appropriate prudential policy to prevent them is a chal- 
lenge for all of us. 
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2. Kathryn M. Dominguez 
The Role of the Yen 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Over 90 percent of American exporters sell their goods abroad using con- 
tracts denominated in dollars. Over 80 percent of German exporting companies 
denominate their sales in deutsche marks. Over 50 percent of French and Brit- 
ish exports are denominated in francs and pounds sterling, respectively. This 
pattern of invoicing exports in domestic currencies is characteristic of most de- 
veloped countries with a single, notable exception: Japan. Japanese companies 
are more likely to denominate exports in dollars than in yen. 
This paper analyzes the role of the yen in international financial and com- 
mercial transactions. Over the past twenty-five years the yen has played a sur- 
prisingly small role in international markets. Far fewer commercial contracts, 
bonds, bank loans, and official reserves are denominated in yen than in U.S. 
dollars, and fewer in yen than in deutsche marks, in spite of the size and perfor- 
mance of the Japanese economy. Nowhere is this puzzle more apparent than in 
Japan itself, where Japanese companies and investors are more likely to trans- 
act in dollars than in yen. 
There are several possible explanations for the apparent underutilization of 
the yen. The first is habit formation. After the Second World War the dollar 
replaced the pound sterling as the dominant currency in world trade. Although 
the U.S. economy has declined in importance, habit formation works to main- 
tain the central role of the dollar. A second explanation is that a large and 
growing share of Japan’s exports go to the United States, and U.S. imports are 
predominately invoiced in dollars. Third, the short-term capital market in Japan 
is relatively underdeveloped. For example, the size of the Japanese treasury 
bill market is much smaller than that in the United States. Foreign investors or 
importers receiving yen therefore have fewer opportunities to park their yen- 
denominated funds. Also, high transaction costs in the bankers’ acceptance 
market limit the amount of trade financed in yen. A fourth explanation involves 
the role of Japan’s large trading companies that handle the bulk of Japan’s ex- 
ports (and imports). It may be that these trading companies are able effectively 
to hedge the foreign exchange risks that arise when Japanese exports are de- 
nominated in foreign currencies. 
The author is grateful to the NBER for financial support; to Martin Feldstein, James Hines, 
and Gunter Dufey for comments and suggestions; to Peter Boberg, Pat McGuire, and Heather 
Montgomery for help in translating Japanese documents; to Hidetoshi Fukuda for helpful discus- 
sions and for providing access to his survey results; and to Takatoshi Ito and David Weinstein for 
assistance in obtaining data. 
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Over time it should be the case that any impact of dollar habit formation on 
yen usage should diminish; similarly, any limitations on short-term yen in- 
vesting and financing should have little long-run impact. Further, although 
these considerations might explain the dominance of the dollar over the yen, 
they apply equally well to Germany, yet the deutsche mark is much less domi- 
nated by the dollar than is the yen. The only explanation, of the first three, that 
distinguishes Germany from Japan is the bias in Japanese exports toward the 
U.S. market. Exports to the United States do not directly explain why Japanese 
companies invoice so rarely in yen, but this bias combined with “pricing to 
market” strategies often followed by Japanese firms may partly explain low 
yen invoice ratios. 
Pricing-to-market models imply that firms set their export prices in foreign 
currencies if profits are at risk of falling sharply when the domestic currency 
appreciates yet profits rise only slowly when the foreign currency appreciates 
(in other words, profits are concave functions of the exchange rate). If the re- 
verse is true (profits are convex functions of the exchange rate), then exporters 
will prefer to invoice in the domestic currency (see Krugman 1987; Giovannini 
1988). Fukuda and Ji (1994) found empirical evidence supporting the hypothe- 
sis that the profits of Japanese firms generally fall more rapidly as the yen ap- 
preciates than they rise when the yen depreciates. However, this explanation ig- 
nores the possibility that exporters can hedge exchange rate risk. If hedging is 
possible and not too costly, invoicing can be separated from exchange rate risk 
management and pricing-to-market behavior will not necessarily be related to 
the choice of the invoice currency. The fourth explanation for the low yen in- 
voice ratios is related to this point. If the large Japanese trading companies are 
able effectively to hedge the exchange rate exposure exporting firms face when 
invoicing in currencies other than the yen, then pricing-to-market behavior 
does not explain the low yen invoice ratios. 
The final explanation, that large trading companies effectively hedge the 
foreign currency exposure of Japanese exporters, does not explain why the dol- 
lar remains the dominant currency used in Japan. If hedging is possible and rela- 
tively costless, then the denomination of the invoice currency is, in principle, 
arbitrary. On the other hand, the dollar remains the dominant currency in deriv- 
ative markets, suggesting that the cost of hedging dollar exposure may be lower 
than for other currencies. 
There are signs that the yen is being used more heavily in international 
capital markets even as yen invoice ratios remain low. The share of yen- 
denominated sovereign debt has risen dramatically, at the expense of the dollar, 
in certain Asian and Pacific countries. Over a quarter of new bond issues by 
developing countries and countries in transition are now denominated in yen. 
And the volume of yen transactions in over-the-counter foreign exchange de- 
rivative contracts now exceeds those denominated in deutsche marks. 
What is the ultimate significance of the continued underutilization of the 
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yen? In the short run, a case can be made that the low yen invoice ratios accen- 
tuate the slow adjustment of Japanese bilateral current account imbalances. 
The Japanese economy has run large and persistent current account surpluses 
with the rest of the world, and particularly with the United States. Theory indi- 
cates that such surpluses are unlikely to persist over prolonged periods. If ex- 
change rates are flexible, then the value of the domestic currency should rise 
in response to a current account surplus, rendering export goods less competi- 
tive and imports more attractive so that, in equilibrium, a country’s current ac- 
count returns to balance. If exports are invoiced in the domestic currency, the 
automatic adjustment process is straightforward. However, if exports are in- 
voiced in the foreign currency and relative prices remain unchanged (perhaps 
due to pricing-the-market behavior), the adjustment process is far from auto- 
matic. Of course, if the domestic currency strengthens and relative prices do 
not change, the profits of exporting firms (as denominated in the domestic 
currency) will fall. Eventually, relative prices must change if exporters are to 
stay in business. Price adjustment therefore implies that the significance of yen 
invoicing lies in its implications for short-run adjustments and not long-run 
resource flows. 
This paper explores the reasons why the role of the yen has not kept pace 
with the rise in Japan’s economic power in world trade, as well as the implica- 
tions of this pattern for Japan and the rest of the world. The paper is organized 
in five sections. Section 3.2.2 reviews the history of Japanese inflation, the li- 
beralization of the Japanese financial markets, and the international use of the 
yen. Section 3.2.3 explores the reasons why the yen is rarely used as an invoic- 
ing currency in international trade. Section 3.2.4 examines the practice of yen 
exchange rate risk management and shows how hedging techniques can be 
used by Japanese firms to offset the risks of invoicing in foreign currencies. 
Section 3.2.5 considers the relation between the international use of the yen 
and the Japanese balance of payments. Section 3.2.6 concludes the paper by 
analyzing the significance of the relatively minor role of the yen in interna- 
tional markets. 
3.2.2 The International Role of the Yen 
The U.S. dollar is the dominant international currency. The dollar is widely 
used in international trade contracts, it makes up the bulk of international re- 
serves, and over 80 percent of the derivative market is dollar based. The Ger- 
man mark is second in importance after the dollar, while the Japanese yen is a 
distant third. Domestic and international currency demands depend on several 
factors that include the ease with which currency transactions can be made, 
the stability of a currency’s purchasing power, regulatory oversight of the cur- 
rency, and the investment opportunities available in the currency. This section 
reviews each of the factors that influence demand for the yen. 
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The Theory of International Currency Use 
International currency uses are similar to national currency uses. An interna- 
tional currency is a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value 
outside the country in which it is issued. So, for example, the dollar is used to 
discharge financial obligations, used to denominate trade contracts, and serves 
as an investment asset for individuals, companies, and governments outside of 
the United States. An international currency is considered a “vehicle” if it is 
used to denominate and execute foreign trade and international capital transac- 
tions that do not involve direct transactions with the issuing country. 
The same factors that determine whether a currency is used internationally 
also influence its use as a vehicle currency, although most international curren- 
cies are not vehicle currencies. For example, the Mexican peso is an interna- 
tional currency in that it is widely held and used by traders and investors out- 
side of Mexico. On the other hand, the peso is not a vehicle currency in that it 
would rarely be used in transactions other than those involving at least one 
party from Mexico. Vehicle currencies are distinguished from international 
currencies by their relatively low transaction costs (see Krugman 1980; Black 
1991). After all, parties to a transaction are unlikely to use a currency other 
than one of their own unless using the third currency is considerably cheaper 
than the alternatives. Transaction costs for currencies, in turn, are likely to be 
lowest for currencies that are heavily used. Moreover, once a currency emerges 
as a vehicle, economies of scale come into play, reducing transaction costs yet 
further (see Swoboda 1968; Krugman 1984). 
Historical studies of the emergence of the pound sterling as the dominant 
vehicle currency during the second half of the nineteenth century and the rise 
of the dollar after World War I1 suggest that at least two conditions must de- 
scribe an issuing country for its currency to achieve dominance (see, e.g., Co- 
hen 1971; McKinnon 1979). First, the value of the currency should be rela- 
tively stable. Second, the country issuing a dominant international currency 
should have well-developed financial markets. The next two sections examine 
Japan’s inflation history and the development of Japanese financial markets in 
order to determine whether Japan satisfies the two conditions needed for the 
yen to achieve vehicle status. 
Japan’s Inflation History 
Monetary policy decisions in Japan are not made by an independent central 
bank. The Bank of Japan Law authorizes the Policy Board, which includes 
representatives of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), to formulate, direct, and 
supervise Japanese monetary policy. Over the past twenty years, MOF influ- 
ence on Bank of Japan (BOJ) policy decisions has varied with changes in top 
personnel and economic conditions. Typically, when the BOJ wants to change 
monetary policy, it consults with MOF, the finance minister, and the prime 
minister before coming to a decision. The objectives of Japanese monetary 
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policy have undergone substantial changes over the past two decades, focusing 
alternately on economic growth, the value of the yen, the balance of payments, 
and inflation. The BOJ has no legal mandate to maintain price stability. 
In the early 1970s, partly as a result of the first oil price shock, the Japanese 
inflation rate exceeded that in the United States or Germany. From 1970 to 
1975 Japan’s inflation averaged over 10 percent, while inflation in the United 
States and Germany averaged 6 percent. In the second half of the 1970s Japa- 
nese inflation rates continued to exceed those in Germany but were, on average, 
slightly lower than inflation rates in the United States. In the 1980s inflation 
rates in all three countries were significantly lower; German and Japanese in- 
flation rates were roughly comparable, and U.S. inflation was about 2 percent- 
age points higher. More recently, Japanese rates of inflation have been well 
below those of both Germany and the United States; indeed, using some defini- 
tions of price changes, Japan is currently experiencing deflation. 
Of the G-7 countries, Japan experienced the highest rate of inflation variabil- 
ity (6 percent) in the 1970s. In contrast, in the 1980s Japan had the third lowest 
rate of inflation variability, only 0.1 percent above that of Germany. These data 
suggest that markets might have doubted the stability of the yen’s purchasing 
power in the 1970s, but for the past decade and a half Japan’s inflation record 
has been comparable to that of Germany and slightly better than the U.S. rec- 
ord. Therefore, Japan’s more recent inflation performance might more credibly 
establish the purchasing power stability of the yen. At the same time, however, 
that Japan’s inflation rate has stabilized at a low level, so too have the inflation 
rates of the other G-7 countries. It may be that one of the impediments to 
greater international use of the yen is the wide array of other currencies that 
currently have strong records of low and stable inflation. 
The Liberalization of Japanese Financial Markets 
In the period after World War I1 and before the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system, the Japanese monetary authorities actively discouraged interna- 
tional use of the yen. Historical accounts suggest that Japanese policymakers 
were concerned that, if the yen were widely held outside of Japan, then the 
BOJ’s ability to control the yen money supply would be substantially reduced. 
Consequently, Japanese financial markets were highly regulated and capital 
inflows and outflows severely limited. Moreover, the financial system was de- 
signed to encourage personal saving and to direct financial resources to chosen 
private and public investment projects. 
In the mid- 1970s Japan entered a recession along with most of the G-7 coun- 
tries as a consequence of which the corporate sector demand for funds declined 
and large government budget deficits emerged for the first time in postwar 
Japan. The public sector became a net borrower of funds; the number of gov- 
ernment bonds outstanding rose eightfold from 1974 to 1982 (see Eken 1984). 
Japan’s bond markets grew dramatically over this period, and a rising share of 
bank portfolios consisted of government bonds. Further, in order to reduce the 
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burden of the government debt, interest rates on new issues were kept below 
market levels. At the same time the Japanese financial community, and partic- 
ularly Japanese banks, began to demand changes in the financial system. Japa- 
nese bank profits suffered as a consequence of the low interest rates they re- 
ceived on government debt and the highly regulated interest rates they were 
allowed to offer depositors. In order to compete with other financial institu- 
tions Japanese banks needed to be able to offer new financial instruments and 
to access international capital markets. 
Deregulation of Japan’s financial markets began in the late 1970s. Table 3.6 
provides a chronology of Japanese financial market liberalization starting in 
the 1970s. One of the first measures taken was to allow resale of government 
bonds. As a consequence the primary and secondary government bond markets 
dramatically expanded. At the same time the Gensaki market (for repurchase 
agreements on government bonds) and the market for certificates of deposit 
were established. In 1980 the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control 
Law was enacted, under which capital flows were gradually liberalized al- 
though numerous restrictions on outflows and inflows remained. In 1984, in 
the aftermath of the Yen-Dollar Agreement,’ and in part to allay U.S. and other 
G-7 concerns that the closed nature of Japanese domestic markets was artifi- 
cially depressing the value of the yen, a new phase of financial market liberal- 
ization was initiated. A number of measures were taken to increase foreign 
access to Japanese financial markets and to allow Japanese capital to flow into 
the Eurocurrency markets. In June 1984 the conversion of foreign currencies 
into yen was completely decontrolled; in June 1985 the market for yen- 
denominated bankers’ acceptances was created and the Japanese government 
was allowed to issue short-term bonds to refinance existing debt; in June 1986 
foreign banks were given permission to issue Euroyen bonds; in December 
1986 the Tokyo offshore market was created; and in November 1987 the Euro- 
yen commercial paper market was decontrolled. 
The implementation of BOJ monetary policy has undergone substantial 
changes in the past twenty years in conjunction with the deregulation of finan- 
cial markets. The intermediate target of BOJ monetary policy shifted in mid- 
1978 from bank lending to a broadly defined money stock. Money market op- 
erations also shifted from “window guidance,” or moral suasion, together with 
direct control of interest rates, to controlling the supply of reserves to the bank- 
ing system and thereby indirectly influencing interbank interest rates. The dis- 
count rate in Japan is the rate at which commercial banks can borrow funds 
from the BOJ, and it is always lower than the interbank rate. Consequently, 
discount window lending is rationed by the BOJ.2 The two-month bill discount 
1. See Frankel (1984) for a detailed description of the Yen-Dollar Agreement. 
2. Further, the level of discount window lending changes at the initiative of the BOJ, rather than 
at the initiative of private banks (as in the United States and Germany). 
Table 3.6 Chronology of Japanese Finandal Market Liberalization 
Month and Year Measure 
March 1972 
December 1973 
August 1974 
May 1979 
December 1980 
June 1983 
April 1984 
June 1984 
December 1984 
April 1985 
June 1985 
October 1985 
April 1986 
June 1986 
December 1986 
April 1987 
May 1987 
November 1987 
May 1989 
September 1994 
December 1994 
May 1997 
April 1998 
Japanese banks permitted to purchase foreign securities 
Abolition of limits on acquisition of Japanese bonds and equities by 
Liberalization of acquisition of fiscal bills by foreign investors 
Foreigners permitted to engage in Gensaki market 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law enacted 
Short-term Euroyen loans to nonresidents liberalized 
External yen loans liberalized 
Rules for yen bond issuance and management relaxed 
Guidelines for Euroyen bond issuance by residents relaxed 
Conversion of foreign currencies into yen completely decontrolled 
Guidelines for Euroyen bond issuance by nonresidents relaxed 
Market for Euroyen certificates of deposit (CDs) (with maturity of six 
Withholding tax on resident Euroyen bonds abolished 
Medium- and long-term Euroyen loans to nonresidents liberalized 
Nonresident Eurobonds diversified (to include, e.g., dual-currency bonds) 
Market for yen-denominated bankers’ acceptances created 
Temporary Interest Rates Adjustment Law (TIRAL) begins liberalization 
Maximum maturity of Euroyen CDs extended (from six months to one 
Restrictions on the recycling of Euroyen relaxed (mandatory holding 
foreign investors 
months) created 
process of interest rates on large time deposits 
Year) 
period for funds borrowed in the Euroyen market reduced from 180 to 
90 days) 
Foreign banks given permission to issue Euroyen bonds 
Tokyo offshore market created 
Medium-term Euroyen bonds (wtih maturities of four years or longer) 
deregulated 
Yen-denominated bankers’ acceptances further liberalized (by lowering 
the minimum denomination from YlOO million to Y50 million and 
extending the maturity from six months to one year) 
Euroyen commercial paper issuance by nonresidents decontrolled 
Restrictions on Euroyen loans to residents relaxed 
Interest rates on demand deposits, with the exception of current deposits, 
liberalized (part of TIRAL) 
MOF lifts ban on issuance of asset-backed corporate bonds by Japanese 
firms overseas 
Tokyo Foreign Market Practice Committee abolishes the time limit on 
foreign exchange trading hours, thereby making twenty-four-hour 
trading possible in Tokyo 
Amendment of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law 
passes the Diet 
Permission and prior notification requirements for all external settlements 
and capital transactions abolished 
Source: Fukao (1990) and Tavlas and Ozeki (1992); original data from Bank of Tokyo, Tokyo 
Financial Review (various issues), and Bank of Japan, Annual Review (various issues). 
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rate, the interbank rate that serves as an intermediate target for the BOJ, often 
diverged from comparable market interest rates during the 1980s. For example, 
in the summer of 1988, Euroyen rates were markedly higher than comparable 
bill discount rates, suggesting that arbitrage between offshore and onshore 
markets was not then possible. 
In November 1988 the BOJ introduced a number of measures intended to 
further liberalize Japanese domestic money markets. One of the more impor- 
tant of these measures consisted of shifting BOJ market interventions into mar- 
kets for securities of shorter maturities, including the one- to three-week bill 
market and the overnight commercial paper market. One of the goals of the 
1988 reform effort was to enhance interest rate arbitrage between the domes- 
tic and offshore markets, as well as arbitrage between the interbank and open 
money  market^.^ Since the reforms were implemented, the markets for shorter 
maturity instruments have grown dramatically and short-term interest rates are 
now more reflective of market  condition^.^ 
By 1990 virtually all the restrictions on Japanese capital flows had been 
eliminated. However, a number of the new financial instruments introduced in 
the 1980s have yet to develop significant market depth. For example, compli- 
cated operating procedures have hampered the development of the yen bank- 
ers’ acceptance market; trading in the Gensaki market is complex due to the 
tax on securities transactions; and the treasury bill market is relatively inactive. 
In November 1996 Prime Minister Hashimoto initiated a financial system re- 
form plan to liberalize the remaining restrictions on Japanese financial mar- 
k e t ~ . ~  A drastic revision of the foreign exchange law took effect on l April 
1998. And in principle, permission and prior notification for all external settle- 
ments and capital transactions are no longer required. 
Although Japanese financial markets have changed dramatically over the 
past twenty-five years, many of the important liberalization measures are rela- 
tively recent. It is clear that the highly restrictive financial market structure put 
in place immediately after World War I1 actively discouraged international use 
of the yen. Deregulation has reversed this policy, but the pace of financial mar- 
ket reform has been quite slow. Part of the reason the yen is so little used in- 
ternationally may be the incompletely developed financial markets in Japan. 
3. The maturities of collateralized commercial bills were extended on the short end to one week, 
so that their maturities now range from one week to six months, compared with one month to six 
months previously; the maturities of collateralized call trading now range from overnight to one 
week, compared with overnight to three weeks previously. Also, the maturities of uncollateralized 
call trading were lengthened to a range of overnight to six months. For further discussion, see 
Tavlas and Ozeki (1992). 
4. Prior to November 1988 the daily variation in the two-month bill discount rate was typically 
very small, reflecting the smoothing operations of the BOJ. Since the reform, the variation in the 
bill discount rate, as well as other short-term rates, has markedly increased. 
5. Details of the 1997 financial system reform are currently available on the MOF home page 
(www.mof.go.jp). 
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Stylized Facts about the International Use of the Yen 
International use of the yen has increased steadily over the past two decades. 
This is not surprising given the relatively low base from which the yen market 
started in the early 1970s. Moreover, the share of yen-denominated instruments 
varies widely across financial markets. A small percentage of international 
bonds are denominated in yen, while the share of yen-denominated sovereign 
debt in selected countries is relatively high. This section examines data on the 
use of the yen as a medium of exchange, as a reserve currency in central bank 
portfolios, and as an investment currency. 
The Yen as a Medium of Exchange 
Information concerning the currency composition of the spot foreign ex- 
change market is not readily available because physical markets for foreign 
exchange transactions do not exist. The foreign exchange market is decentral- 
ized, and data on the volume of global trading are not collected. However, 
starting in 1989 the central banks of twenty-one countries began a triennial 
survey of foreign exchange turnover in the interbank markets in an attempt to 
estimate global activity in the spot and various derivative markets. (The survey 
in 1995 included twenty-six countries.) Table 3.7 presents data on the currency 
Table 3.1 Selected Currencies in Global Gross Foreign Exchange lhrnover 
(percentage share) 
Currency April 1989 April 1992 April 1995 
US. dollar 
Deutsche marP 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
French franc 
Swiss franc 
Canadian dollar 
Australian dollar 
ECU 
Other EMS currencies 
Currencies of other reporting countries 
Other currencies 
All currenciesb 
90 
21 
21 
15 
2 
10 
1 
2 
1 
3 
3 
19 
200 
82 
40 
23 
14 
4 
9 
3 
2 
3 
9 
3 
8 
200 
83 
31 
24 
10 
8 
I 
3 
3 
2 
13 
2 
8 
200 
Source: BIS (1995, table F-3). 
Nore: Number of reporting countries in 1989: 21; in both 1992 and 1995: 26. Data for 1989 and 
data for Finland in 1992 include options and futures. Data for 1989 cover local currency trading 
only, except for the U.S. dollar, deutsche mark, Japanese yen, pound sterling, Swiss franc, and 
ECU. The figures relate to gross turnover because comparable data on a “net-gross’’ or “net-net’’ 
basis are not available for 1989. 
“Data for April 1989 exclude domestic trading involving the deutsche mark in Germany. 
bColumns sum to 200 percent because both buying and selling volumes are included. 
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Table 3.8 Currency Composition of Foreign Exchange Activity by Country, April 1995 
(daily averages; millions of U.S. dollars) 
Specified Currency against All Other Currencies 
Country Total U.S. Dollar Deutsche Mark Japanese Yen Pound Sterling ECU 
United Kingdom 463,769 
United States 244,371 
Japan 161,316 
Singapore 105,42 1 
Hong Kong 90,198 
Switzerland 86,462 
Germany 76,236 
France 58,047 
Australia 39,534 
Denmark 30,543 
Canada 29,814 
Belgium 28,107 
Netherlands 25,509 
Italy 23,248 
Sweden 19,947 
Luxembourg 19,060 
Spain 18,261 
Austria 13,340 
Norway 7,557 
New Zealand 7,115 
Finland 5,302 
South Africa 4,979 
Ireland 4,875 
Greece 3,291 
Bahrain 3,080 
Portugal 2,382 
TotaP 1,571,785 
387,914 
211,072 
151,150 
95,818 
84,155 
62,676 
55,477 
38,215 
36,896 
21,673 
28,793 
23,179 
17,754 
17,708 
13,141 
14,872 
13,897 
10,254 
5,499 
6,755 
2,986 
4,737 
2,518 
2,059 
2,844 
1,397 
1.3 13,440 
164,677 
103,755 
25,684 
33,597 
25,746 
40,981 
58,106 
27,087 
10,800 
11,248 
4,754 
8,682 
1 1,006 
5,692 
9,881 
11,029 
7,252 
9,565 
3,045 
1,039 
2,930 
815 
2,879 
1,554 
938 
1,074 
583,816 
92,180 
54,767 
1303 10 
29,460 
28,050 
8,034 
5,942 
4,854 
6,162 
749 
1,762 
1,876 
1,287 
485 
665 
694 
393 
214 
139 
916 
47 
210 
171 
786 
523 
199 
371,375 
74,167 
23,298 
3,587 
8.0 I5 
7,144 
3,807 
3,600 
1,810 
3,119 
571 
1,259 
1,647 
2,998 
242 
342 
484 
585 
115 
170 
282 
109 
176 
1,841 
54 
23 1 
37 
139,689 
18,118 
2,430 
357 
518 
1,944 
1,456 
4,183 
379 
2,458 
685 
1,290 
111 
1,042 
216 
61 
73 
1 
217 
20 
424 
126 
2 
74 
127,234 
- 
- 
- 
Source: BIS (1995, table 1-D). 
Note: Table reports spot, outright forward, and exchange swap transactions. 
'Becaused two currencies are involved in each transaction, the sum of transactions in individual currencies 
comes to twice total reported turnover. 
composition of global spot foreign exchange turnover from these central bank 
surveys. (These data are made available by the Bank for International Settle- 
ments-BIS .) 
According to the BIS surveys, use of the yen relative to other currencies has 
actually declined over the past five years. While use of the dollar has fallen, it 
is the deutsche mark and other European Monetary System (EMS) currencies, 
rather than the yen, that have replaced the dollar in some markets. Table 3.8 
indicates that yen trading tends to be concentrated in Asian and Pacific centers 
as well as in the United States and the United Kingdom. In these markets, 
major shares of yen turnover are reported (between 14 and 29 percent), but yen 
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trading accounts for low single percentages in most other markets. Although 
practically all markets report some turnover in yen trades against domestic cur- 
rencies, most yen transactions involve the U.S. dollar (85 percent), the pound 
sterling (6 percent), or the deutsche mark (5 percent). In contrast to London 
and New York, the range of currencies actively traded in Tokyo is limited: 76 
percent of all turnover in Japan involves the yen and the U.S. dollar, up from 
67 percent in 1992. 
Unsurprisingly, the yen is used most heavily domestically, with the United 
Kingdom and the United States ranked two and three in terms of total transac- 
tions. In percentage terms, however, it is in Singapore and Hong Kong that the 
yen is used most heavily. Other than in Japan, the yen is always ranked behind 
the U.S. dollar, and with the exception of Hong Kong, the yen is also always 
ranked behind the deutsche mark in terms of total currency transactions in each 
of the countries.6 
The Yen as a Reserve Currency 
Central banks hold foreign reserves to facilitate trade and to affect exchange 
rates through interventions in foreign exchange markets. The importance of 
currencies as international media of exchange and stores of value can therefore 
be inferred from their relative shares in official reserves. Table 3.9 presents ag- 
gregate data on the currency composition of all official reserve holdings and, 
for available years, the holdings of selected Asian c~untries.~ 
The share of the yen in official reserve holdings has remained relatively low 
and stable over the past fifteen years for all countries, and it actually fell be- 
tween 1985 and 1990 in selected Asian countries. The U.S. dollar remains the 
dominant currency held in aggregate by central banks, and the share of Asian 
central bank reserves denominated in dollars has risen, not fallen, in recent 
years. 
The Yen as an Investment Currency 
One of the characteristics of international currencies, and particularly ve- 
hicle currencies, is their use to denominate investments. Until the mid-l970s, 
most international bonds, Eurocurrency deposits, and international bank loans 
were denominated in dollars. Over the past twenty-five years the share of 
dollar-denominated investments has fallen, and depending on the particular 
form of investment, the relative shares of those denominated in deutsche marks 
and yen have risen. 
The share of yen-denominated international bonds (Eurobonds plus foreign 
currency bonds) rose dramatically in the second half of the 1980s. Table 3.10 
6. It should be noted that the Japanese yen reached a postwar peak against the US. dollar during 
the month in which the BIS conducted its 1995 survey, possibly biasing the 1995 numbers. 
7. Garber made the case that these data may not fully reflect actual central bank reserve hold- 
ings: “The data suffer from an incompleteness of coverage, as some countries that may carry 
weight in the demand for yen reserves do not regularly respond to the IMF’s inqujr” (1996, 8). 
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Table 3.9 Currency Composition of Official Reserve Holdings 
(percentage share) 
Currency 1980 1985 1990 1995' 
Japanese yen 
All countries 
Selected Asian countries 
All countries 
Selected Asian countries 
All countries 
Selected Asian countries 
Deutsche mark 
All countries 
Selected Asian countries 
All countries 
Selected Asian countries 
All countries 
Selected Asian countries 
All countries 
Selected Asian countries 
All countries 
U.S. dollar 
Pound sterling 
French franc 
Swiss franc 
Netherlands guilder 
Unspecified currencies 
4.4 
13.9 
8.0 
26.9 
8.2 
17.1 
7.5 
n.a. 
68.6 
48.6 
64.9 
44.8 
50.3 
62.7 
56.4 
n.a. 
2.9 
3 .O 
3.0 
4.1 
3.2 
4.9 
3.4 
n.a. 
14.9 
20.6 
15.2 
16.4 
17.4 
14.2 
13.7 
n.a. 
1.7 
0.6 
0.9 
0.9 
2.3 
0.2 
1.8 
n.a. 
3.2 
10.6 
2.3 
4.9 
1.3 
0.5 
0.9 
n.a. 
1.3 
2.8 
1 .o 
2.1 
1 .o 
0.5 
0.4 
n.a. 
6.7 9.7 3 .O 4.6 
Selected Asian countriesb n.a. - - - 
Source: IMF, Annual Report (Washington, D.C., 1996), and Tavlas and Ozeki (1992). 
"The holdings of selected Asian countries are not available for 1995. 
bThe holdings of unspecified currencies by the selected Asian countries have been negligible 
indicates that the yen share reached a peak in 1990 at 13.5 percent of the inter- 
national bond market. By 1996, however, the yen share had fallen back to just 
over 8 percent of the market. Part of the explanation for the sudden rise and 
fall in numbers of yen-denominated bonds is that, in the early 1990s, many 
Japanese companies had difficulty raising funds in the stock market due to the 
fall in stock prices, and therefore they turned to international bonds for alterna- 
tive financing (Taguchi 1994). The data suggest that this shift to bond financing 
reversed itself by 1996. Further, aggregate yen-denominated issuance of long- 
term international bonds contracted further in 1997, apparently due in large 
part to Japanese investors shifting their purchases of foreign securities away 
from straight Euroyen and dual-currency Samurai issues toward U.S. dollar 
and sterling bonds (BIS 1997). 
Although the yen share in the overall international bond market is relatively 
low, yen-denominated bond issues by developing countries and countries in 
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Table 3.10 Currency Composition of international Bonds (percentage share) 
Currency 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1996 
U.S. dollar 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
Swiss franc 
Deutsche mark 
ECU 
Other 
Total 
(billion US$) 
50.6 
0.4 
0.2 
17.1 
16.4 
15.3 
100.0 
(20.0) 
42.7 60.6 33.3 
4.8 7.7 13.5 
3.0 4.2 9.5 
19.5 8.9 10.5 
21.9 6.7 8.3 
- 4.1 8.1 
8.1 7.8 16.8 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
(38.3) (167.8) (240.2) 
28.5 
12.9 
9.1 
7.3 
7.1 
11.1 
24.0 
100.0 
(3 11.4) 
43.0 
8.6 
8.8 
3.3 
14.0 
0.7 
21.6 
100 
(719.0) 
Source: OECD, Financial Market Trends (Paris, various issues). 
transition has risen dramatically; the yen’s share in these issues rose from 13 
percent in 1994 to 26 percent in 1995 (It0 and Folkerts-Landau 1996). The 
expansion of the yen market in bonds issued by developing countries is due 
to the relatively low interest rates prevailing in Japan and the elimination (in 
January 1994) of the ninety-day lockup period before which sovereign yen- 
denominated Eurobonds could be sold to Japanese investors after initial place- 
ment.* 
Bank deposits of currencies held outside countries of issue are termed Euro- 
currency deposits. The volume of transactions in the Eurocurrency market is 
now well over $4 trillion on a net basis (netting out all interbank deposits). As 
a matter of accounting, a currency’s share in the Eurocurrency deposit market 
rises as the currency appreciates against other currencies. Given the substantial 
appreciation of the yen in 1995, therefore, we might expect the yen share in 
the Eurocurrency market to have risen, but the data in table 3.11 indicate that 
the yen share has remained low. The share of yen-denominated Eurocurrency 
deposits has only risen 4 percentage points since 1980, when 1 percent of de- 
posits were denominated in yen. Table 3.11 shows that Eurodollar deposits 
make up over 44 percent of the Eurocurrency market, and mark-denominated 
deposits are ranked second at 15 percent. The other European currencies, in- 
cluding the ECU, have smaller than 5 percent shares in the Eurocurrency mar- 
ket. At the same time, Europe is the dominant region for Eurobanking (56 
percent of the market in 1995). Japan’s share in the Eurocurrency market was 
9 percent, just below that of the United States (at 11 percent) in 1995. 
Table 3.12 shows that while the share of yen-denominated international bank 
lending increased twofold from 1991 to 1995, the share of mark-denominated 
international bank lending increased fivefold. Shares of bank loans denomi- 
nated in U.S. dollars, pounds sterling, and Swiss francs fell over the period. 
8. Most international yen bonds are either Euroyen issues or Samurai bond issues. Samurai 
bonds are issued by non-Japanese residents and sold to investors in Japan under Japanese regula- 
tions, while Euroyen bonds are issued in the international offshore market. 
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Table 3.11 Currency Composition of Eurocurrency Deposits (percentage share) 
Currency 1980 1985 1990 1991a 1996‘ 
U.S. dollar 61.3 67.1 52.9 50.8 44.8 
Japanese yen 1.1 3.4 5.0 4.8 5.6 
Pound sterling 2.3 1.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 
Swiss franc 5.3 6.5 5.6 3.2 4.1 
Deutsche mark 12.2 11.7 16.2 15.6 15.3 
ECU - 2.4 4.4 5.1 2.9 
Other 17.8 6.4 12.6 14.9 24.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(billion US$) (1,056) (1,385) (3,576) (3,508) (4,288) 
Source: BIS, “International Banking and Financial Market Developments” (Basel, various issues). 
Note: Foreign-currency-denominated cross-border positions by BIS reporting banks, shares are 
based only on liabilities. 
*First nine months of 1991 and 1996. 
Table 3.12 Currency Composition of International Bank Lending 
(percentage share) 
Currency 1980 1985 1990 1991“ 1995 
U.S. dollar 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
Swiss franc 
Deutsche mark 
ECU 
Other 
Total 
(billion US$) 
66.3 
2.7 
2.2 
14.4 
7 .O 
0.0 
1.4 
100.0 
(1,500.1) 
64.6 49.8 49.6 
2.7 4.5 4.0 
5.7 11.2 11.6 
11.3 14.5 13.2 
6.4 5.5 5 .O 
2.2 3.3 3.8 
7.1 11.2 12.8 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
(2,557.2) (6,132.4) (5,735.4) 
23.9 
10.5 
5.8 
2.6 
20.1 
4.8 
32.3 
100.0 
(7,753.9) 
Source: BIS, “International Banking and Financial Market Developments” (Basel, various issues). 
“First nine months of 1991. 
Although yen-denominated international bank lending has significantly lower 
volume than do dollar and deutsche mark lending, Japanese banks rank first in 
terms of international banking assets. In 1997 international lending by Japa- 
nese banks represented 22 percent of the world market, a thirteen-year low, but 
a share that nevertheless exceeds those of German banks (17 percent) and U.S. 
banks (1 1 percent). Japanese banks have reduced international lending since 
the early 1990s due to the new capital adequacy ratio requirements and the dis- 
mantling of restrictions on the domestic financial system (BIS 1997). In addi- 
tion, the weakness of domestic credit demand and the recent poor performance 
of the Japanese equity market (which reduced the value of the latent reserves 
included in Japanese banks’ core capital) resulted in a 3 percent drop in Japa- 
nese bank lending between 1996 and 1997. 
Although the overall share of yen-denominated loans is small, the proportion 
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of yen-denominated debt in selected Asian and Pacific countries has risen dra- 
matically in recent years. The increase is in part due to the appreciation of the 
yen in 1995 and the increase in official yen loans as part of an increase in of- 
ficial development aid (Taguchi 1994). 
The yen share in sovereign debt issued by selected countries in Asia and the 
Pacific has also increased dramatically. Table 3.13 shows that, in the case of 
Thailand, over 50 percent of sovereign debt is denominated in yen, up from 
Table 3.13 Sovereign Debt Denomination (percentage share) 
Country 1980 1985 1989 1995 
Indonesia 
Deutsche mark 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
U.S. dollar 
Other currencies 
Total (million US$) 
Korea 
Deutsche mark 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
US. dollar 
Other currencies 
Total (million US$) 
Malaysia 
Deutsche mark 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
U.S. dollar 
Other currencies 
Total (million US$) 
Philippines 
Deutsche mark 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
U.S. dollar 
Other currencies 
Total (million US$) 
Thailand 
Deutsche mark 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
U.S. dollar 
Other currencies 
Total (million US$) 
7.8 
20.0 
0.8 
43.5 
28.0 
15,019.9 
3.7 
16.6 
3.3 
53.5 
22.9 
15,932.8 
3.3 
19.0 
3.6 
38.0 
36.1 
4,007.5 
2.0 
22.0 
0.2 
51.6 
24.3 
6,367.8 
4.7 
25.5 
0.2 
39.7 
29.8 
3,903.8 
6.3 
31.7 
2.1 
30.7 
29.3 
26,845.2 
1.6 
16.7 
1.7 
60.3 
19.8 
28,304.0 
6.0 
26.4 
1.8 
50.6 
15.3 
14,686.5 
0.6 
24.9 
0.2 
47.8 
26.5 
13,782.6 
2.5 
36.1 
0.5 
25.5 
35.4 
9,836.0 
5.2 
34.1 
1.5 
25.0 
34.2 
44,255.0 
4.7 
31.5 
0.7 
33.0 
30.1 
18,787.0 
11.7 
33.4 
1.5 
30.7 
23.2 
14,173.0 
1.5 
31.1 
1 .o 
35.9 
30.5 
24,076.0 
3.6 
42.8 
0.4 
17.8 
35.4 
12,570.0 
4.6 
37.7 
0.9 
20.3 
36.5 
63,848.0 
4.0 
32.2 
0.3 
48.1 
15.4 
27,103.0 
8.0 
39.4 
2.5 
21.6 
28.5 
18,578.0 
1.4 
38.1 
0.3 
30.3 
29.9 
29,517.0 
2.3 
53.0 
0.2 
24.4 
20.1 
16,672.0 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C., 1996). and Tavlas and Ozeki 
(1992). 
Nore: Entries represent percentages of each country’s total sovereign debt. 
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only 25 percent in 1980. The shift into yen-denominated debt by these coun- 
tries is largely at the expense of the dollar. The share of Asian sovereign debt 
denominated in deutsche marks and other European currencies is generally 
less than 5 percent. 
The data presented in this section suggest that while the use of the yen in inter- 
national capital markets has grown substantially since the early 1980s, the U.S. 
dollar and the deutsche mark remain the dominant currencies. The yen’s market 
shares in international bonds, Eurocurrency deposits, external bank loans, and 
official reserves remain well below 20 percent. On the other hand, the share 
of yen-denominated sovereign debt among selected Asian and Pacific countries 
has risen dramatically, suggesting an emerging regional bias toward the yen. 
3.2.3 The Role of the Yen as an Invoicing Currency 
Exporters must determine the currencies in which to denominate their 
prices. Most firms in developed countries choose to invoice exports in domes- 
tic currencies. The advantage of this strategy is that the exporter’s exchange 
rate exposure is thereby minimized. Since invoice prices are not easily changed 
when exchange rates fluctuate, export prices rise when domestic currencies 
strengthen relative to currencies of export destinations. To the extent that 
higher export prices reduce market shares, long-run profits may suffer. This 
line of reasoning suggests that, under certain demand conditions in foreign 
countries, invoicing in the currencies of destination countries may be prefer- 
able to invoicing in domestic currencies. This strategy of focusing on shares of 
foreign markets is termed “pricing to market,” and it is this strategy that Japa- 
nese firms are alleged to follow. This section examines the roles of exchange 
rates and market structure in the invoicing decisions of Japanese firms. 
The Choice of Invoicing Currency in International Trade 
A study of Swedish companies in the 1960s found that the exporter’s cur- 
rency, rather than a common vehicle currency, was most frequently used to 
denominate international trade contracts (Grassman 1973, 1976). This obser- 
vation, commonly known as Grassman’s law, continues to describe most de- 
veloped countries other than Japan. Recent empirical studies of international 
invoicing practices find the following additional patterns: (1) invoicing in the 
exporter’s currency is more likely for differentiated manufactured products; 
(2) trade between a developed country and a developing country tends to be 
denominated in the currency of the developed country; (3) trade in primary 
products and transactions in financial investments are usually denominated in 
U.S. dollars; (4) exports to the United States tend to be invoiced in U.S. dollars; 
and (5) currency hedging by importers in forward markets is not ~ o m m o n . ~  
’ 
9. Magree (1974), Marston (1990), Fukuda and Ji (1994); see Bilson (1983) and Tavlas (1991) 
for overviews. 
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When an exporting firm invoices in a foreign currency, company profits are 
affected by exchange rate changes. Likewise, from an importer’s point of view, 
the cost of foreign products depends on exchange rates if prices are set in 
foreign currencies. Both exporters and importers, therefore, prefer to invoice 
trade contracts in their own currencies in order to minimize foreign exchange 
risk. Given this, why is it commonly observed that exporters (and not import- 
ers) invoice in their own currencies? One explanation is that, in the case of 
differentiated manufacturing products, exporters are likely to have some de- 
gree of monopoly power, as a consequence of which they will have more nego- 
tiating power than importers. Another explanation focuses on the ability of 
both sides to offset exchange rate risks. Importers may be in a better position 
to guard against currency fluctuations by shifting the burden of higher costs 
due to exchange rate changes to their domestic customers. This is most easily 
accomplished in the absence of competing domestic industries. This may be 
the reason trade contracts between developing countries (which are less likely 
to have competing domestic industries) and developed countries tend to be 
invoiced in the developed country’s currency. Mcfinnon (1979) offered yet 
another explanation for observed invoicing patterns. He reported that importers 
often receive open account credits from exporters that allow importers some 
discretion in the timing of their payments in return for bearing currency risk. 
Explanations of why primary products and capital assets are usually denom- 
inated in dollars rely on the role of market structure. Whereas exporters selling 
differentiated products are typically assumed to have some degree of market 
power, international capital markets and markets for primary products are more 
often highly competitive. Because prices in competitive markets tend to be rel- 
atively volatile, it is useful to denominate prices in numbraire currencies in order 
to make price changes as informative as possible (Swoboda 1968; Magree and 
Rao 1980). Further, the numbraire currency is likely to be an established vehi- 
cle currency, such as the dollar. 
It is difficult to explain why hedging exchange rate risk is so uncommon 
among importers. McKinnon (1979) noted that prices of primary goods are de- 
termined by global demand and supply conditions, thereby providing importers 
an automatic hedge. If the value of an importer’s currency falls, the homogen- 
eous nature of the product ensures that the domestic currency price of the im- 
porter’s inventories will rise by the same amount as the exchange rate change. 
Recent Currency Invoicing Practices among the G-6 Countries 
It is instructive to compare invoicing practices among the G-6 countries in 
order to place Japan in context. Table 3.14 presents domestic currency invoice 
ratios for exports and imports by G-6 countries in the years 1980 and 1988. 
Japan and Italy are outliers in the export panel of the table with the lowest 
domestic invoice ratios. In the import panel of table 3.14, Japan’s domestic in- 
voice ratio is well below those of the other G-6 countries. 
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Table 3.14 Domestic Currency Invoice Ratios among the 6 -6  Countries, 1980 and 1988 
1980 1988" 
Country National Currency Japanese Yen Other National Currency Japanese Yen Other 
Exports 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
United States 
imports 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
United States 
62.5 
82.3 
36.0 
29.4 
76.0 
97.0 
33.1 
43.0 
18.0 
2.4 
38.0 
85.0 
- 37.5 
- 17.7 
- 74.0 
29.4 70.6 
- 3.0 
- 24.0 
1.0 65.9 
- 57.0 
2.4 97.6 
1.0 14.0 
- 82.0 
- 62.0 
58.5 
81.5 
38.0 
34.3 
57.0 
96.0 
48.9 
52.6 
27.0 
13.3 
40.0 
85.0 
0.5 41.0 
0.5 18.0 
- 62.0 
34.3 65.7 
- 43.0 
1.0 3.0 
1.3 49.8 
2.5 44.9 
- 73.0 
13.3 86.7 
2.0 58.0 
3.0 12.0 
Sources: Page (1981), Alterman (1989), Black (1993), and Tavlas and Ozeki (1992); original data from 
the ministries of finance of France, Germany, Italy, and Japan and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. 
Nore: Entries are percentages of G-6 trade invoices denominated in national currencies, the yen, or other 
currencies. 
"1988 data. are provided except for German exports and Italian exports and imports, for each of which 
1987 data are provided. 
Why Is the Yen Rarely Used as an Invoicing Currency? 
The share of yen-denominated invoicing of trade contracts is low, especially 
when compared to dollar and deutsche mark shares. Not only is the yen rarely 
used by other countries to denominate trade contracts, the yen is also rarely 
used by Japanese firms. If we compare the use of the yen against the dollar (in 
table 3.15) in Japan's export or import contracts we find that, although the dol- 
lar share has fallen over the years, use of the dollar continues to outstrip that 
of the yen. 
One of the explanations for the low ratio of yen usage in Japan's export and 
import contracts is that a large share of Japanese trade is with the United States. 
U.S. exports and imports tend to be denominated in dollars. In order to ascer- 
tain whether the low use of the yen is mainly due to U.S. dominance of Japan's 
trade, it is instructive to consider whether Japan's trade with other parts of the 
globe are more likely to be denominated in yen. Table 3.16 breaks out the share 
of yen invoicing in Japan's exports and imports to East Asia. 
The data in table 3.16 suggest that the share of yen invoicing in Japanese 
trade contracts with firms in East Asia is indeed higher than the overall share 
and that, at least until 1993, the share was growing. Interestingly, the data show 
that the percentage of yen-invoiced trade contracts with East Asia fell in 1994 
and 1995 but remained higher than those with the world as a whole. 
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Table 3.15 Yen versus Dollar Invoice Ratios in Japan's Exports and 
Imports, 1970-91 
Exports (%) Imports (%) 
Year In Yen In Dollars In Yen In Dollars 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
0.9 
17.5 
28.9 
31.8 
33.8 
42.0 
39.5 
39.3 
36.5 
33.4 
34.3 
34.7 
37.5 
39.4 
90.4 
78.0 
66.3 
62.8 
60.9 
50.2 
53.1 
52.2 
53.5 
55.2 
53.2 
52.4 
48.8 
46.7 
0.3 
0.9 
2.4 
- 
3 .O 
7.3' 
9.7" 
10.6 
13.3 
14.1 
14.5 
15.6 
- 
80.0 
89.9 
93.1 
- 
- 
81.7 
78.5 
77.3 
75.5 
75.4 
Source: Tavlas and Ozeki (1992). Original data on exports until 1982 from BOJ, Yushutsu Shin- 
yojyo Toukei; after 1982, MITI, Export Confirmation Statistics. Original data on imports until 
1980 from MITI, Yushutsu Shyonin, Todokede Houkokusho; 1981-85, MOE Houkokushyorei ni 
Motoduku Houkoku; after 1986, MITI, Import Reporting Statistics. 
Note: Entries are percentages of Japanese trade contracts denominated in yen and dollars. Percent- 
ages are the average over the calendar year, except where otherwise noted. 
"Fiscal year average. 
Beyond reporting aggregate statistics on currency invoice ratios, it is diffi- 
cult to characterize fully the differences between Japanese behavior and that 
of firms elsewhere. However, a number of recent empirical studies of Japanese 
manufacturing firms found evidence of pricing-to-market behavior (Marston 
1990; Fukuda and Ji 1994; Gagnon and be t t e r  1995). Although this evidence 
helps to explain why dollar prices of Japanese goods have not changed one for 
one with the recent movements of the yen against the dollar, it does not explain 
the proclivity of Japanese firms toward invoicing in dollars. As long as Japa- 
nese firms hedge the exchange rate risk that arises when trade is invoiced in a 
foreign currency, pricing-to-market behavior does not depend on the use of a 
particular currency of invoice. In other words, Japanese firms could invoice in 
yen (or any other currency) and simply vary the yen price so that relevant ex- 
change rate changes do not affect final destination prices. The fact that firms 
are able to hedge against adverse movements in the exchange rate effectively 
decouples the relationship between profits and the exchange rate and, in turn, 
weakens the relationship between profits and the invoicing currency. There re- 
mains a puzzle as to why Japan is an outlier among the G-6 in its trade invoic- 
ing practices. 
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Table 3.16 Yen Invoice Ratios in Japan's Exports and Imports to the World and 
East Asia, 1969-96 
Exports (%) Imports (%) 
Year World East Asia World East Asia 
1969 
1979 
1981 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
0.6 
24.9 
31.8 
39.3 
36.5 
33.4 
34.3 
34.7 
37.5 
39.4 
40.1b 
39.9b 
39.7b 
36.0b 
35.9 
- 
29.8 
47.3 
37.5 
41.1 
41.2 
43.5 
48.9 
50.8 
52.5b 
49.0b 
4 4 . 3 b  
- 
- 
7.3" 
9.7" 
10.6 
13.3 
14.1 
14.5 
15.6 
17.0b 
20.9b 
19.2b 
22.7b 
20.5' 
- 
9.2 
11.5 
17.5 
19.5 
19.4 
21.6 
Source: Fukuda (1996). Original data on exports for 1969-82 from BOJ, Statistics of Export 
Credit; 1983-91, MITI, Export Confirmation Statistics; 1992, Report of Settlement Currency; 
1993, Report on Export Currency Movement; 1994-96, Report of Export Settlement Movement. 
Original data on imports for 1969-80 from MITI, Reporting of Import Permit; 1985, MOF, Report; 
1986-91, MITI, Import Reporting Statistics; 1992, MITI, Report on Settlement Currency Move- 
ment; 1993, MITI, Import Reporting Currency Movement; 1994-96, MITI, Report on Import Set- 
tlement Currency Movement. 
Note: Entries are percentages of Japanese trade contracts with the world and with selected Asian 
countries denominated in yen. Percentages are averages over calendar years, except where other- 
wise noted. 
"Fiscal year average. 
bSeptember only average. 
'March only average. 
Survey Evidence on Invoicing Practices from 
Japanese Subsidiaries in the United States 
In order to investigate the reasons why Japanese companies often prefer to 
invoice exports in dollars rather than yen, Hidetoshi Fukuda, an NBER re- 
searcher and former MOF official, conducted a survey of Japanese subsidiaries 
in the United States. Fukuda interviewed the vice-president or head of finance 
of each of twenty-one Japanese companies located in the United States. Al- 
though the scope of each interview varied, each consisted in part of a set of 
standard questions reproduced in the appendix to this paper. In all cases the 
companies agreed to be interviewed under the condition of confidentiality. Fif- 
teen of the companies included in the survey are in the manufacturing sector, 
three are general trading companies, one is a special trading company, one is a 
financial services company, and one is an accounting f i r m . ' O  The sample of 
10. Eight of the companies are located in New York, three in Houston, and ten in Los Angeles. 
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firms surveyed was not selected randomly, and the responses are intended to 
provide suggestive, not statistical, evidence. 
One of the goals of the survey is to learn whether there are particular circum- 
stances in which Japanese companies are more likely to invoice exports in yen. 
Although the majority of the companies surveyed generally invoice their U.S. 
sales in dollars, those interviewed suggested a number of situations in which 
yen invoicing is likely to arise. Such situations include circumstances with un- 
usually long production runs, such as when an export contract is signed at the 
R&D stage of production, Yen-denominated contracts are also more likely if 
(1) production requires a majority of inputs acquired from other Japanese com- 
panies under contracts denominated in yen, (2) the yen-dollar exchange rate is 
unusually volatile, (3) the U.S. importer requests invoicing in yen, (4) the ex- 
ports are going to Asian countries rather than the United States, and (5 )  the ex- 
ports are beef products. 
When asked why their companies invoice in dollars, rather than in an alter- 
native currency, most of the companies surveyed cited the competitive nature 
of U.S. markets. A typical response was that in order to maintain product price 
competitiveness it is necessary to price U S .  exports in dollars. Further, respon- 
dents indicated that management of exchange rate risk is in all cases left to 
the parent company in Japan. For most subsidiaries, exchange rate hedging is 
handled by the finance department of the Japanese parent company on an over- 
all company-wide basis (as opposed to a transaction-by-transaction basis). Fu- 
tures markets are heavily used for exchange rate hedging, and in some compa- 
nies, options are also used. 
In all of the companies surveyed the invoicing currency decision is made by 
the parent company, and there have been no changes in corporate invoicing 
policy in recent memory. A few of those surveyed indicated that there was 
some discussion of switching to yen invoicing in the early 1980s, when the yen 
was weak relative to the dollar. But since the major swing in the yen-dollar 
exchange rate in 1985 there has been no further discussion of changes in in- 
voicing policies. When asked how companies have dealt with the recent wide 
swings in the yen-dollar exchange rate, some of the companies revealed that 
they include provisions in their trade contracts that allow adjustment of dollar 
prices during periods of “excessive” exchange rate volatility. 
None of the companies anticipated increased use of yen invoicing in the near 
future. They suggested that a more likely change would be higher production 
levels and purchase of production inputs in the U.S. market. Interviewees also 
cited recent changes in the U.S. tax treatment of foreign exchange gains and 
losses that makes “netting” easier and, in turn, provides greater incentives to 
invoice in dollars.” One of the impediments to yen invoicing cited by a few of 
11. “Netting” entails offsetting gains on one side of a transaction against losses in another. IRS 
regulations for 1996 permit netting within consolidated groups, thereby making it possible for 
hedging transactions undertaken by one subsidiary to offset risks undertaken by another subsidiary 
(or parent), with tax liabilities generated only by the net position. 
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the companies is the difficulty foreigners face in borrowing and investing yen 
assets in Japanese financial markets. 
3.2.4 Hedging Yen Exchange Rate Risk 
The data presented in section 3.2.3 show that the majority of Japan’s trade 
contracts are denominated in U.S. dollars rather than yen. From a typical Japa- 
nese exporter’s perspective this means that the firm receives dollar revenues 
but incurs most costs in yen. Likewise, Japanese importers need to make pay- 
ments in dollars, although sales are likely to be denominated in yen. In both 
these situations Japanese firms face exchange rate risk. Over the past twenty- 
five years markets in numerous hedging instruments have been created in order 
to provide firms with opportunities to hedge against losses due to adverse ex- 
change rate movements. This section examines the theory and practice of yen 
exchange rate risk management. 
An Overview of Yen Exchange Rate Behavior 
The yen appreciated by 250 percent against the dollar from 1970 to 1994. 
Among other major currencies, only the Swiss franc and the deutsche mark 
appreciated strongly against the dollar (by 225 and 125 percent, respectively) 
over the same period. The rise in the value of the yen relative to the dollar 
occurred in two stages. First, in the 1970s after the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system and in the wake of the 1973 oil shock, the yen strengthened 
from 360 per dollar to just under 200 per dollar. The dollar then strengthened 
considerably in the early 1980s (largely as a consequence of Volcker’s tight 
money regime and Reagan’s fiscal expansion), with the exchange rate above 
200 yen per dollar until late 1985. In the fall of 1985, and in concert with G-5 
intervention efforts to weaken the dollar, the yen began its second dramatic 
appreciation against the dollar, peaking in April 1995 at 80 to the dollar. 
Dramatic movements in the yen-dollar exchange rate over the past twenty- 
five years leave no doubt that Japanese firms invoicing in dollars face substan- 
tial exchange rate risks. However, reports in the financial press in 1993 and 
1994, before the yen had actually peaked against the dollar, suggested that 
Japanese firms anticipated yen weakening. The possibly widely held expecta- 
tion that the yen appreciation against the dollar was temporary may explain 
accompanying reports that many Japanese firms were not adequately hedged 
against exchange rate risk in the early 1990s. After the volatility in the yen- 
dollar rate in 1995, however, it seems unlikely that Japanese firms exposed to 
exchange rate risk would choose to remain unhedged. 
Exchange Rate Hedging Instruments 
An exchange rate hedge provides insurance against adverse currency move- 
ments. A Japanese exporter invoicing in dollars is “completely hedged” if 
changes in the value of the yen relative to the dollar do not influence its yen 
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profits. Such a hedge provides an offsetting cash receipt if the value of the dol- 
lar falls relative to the yen and requires an offsetting cash payment if the dollar 
rises relative to the yen. 
The market for hedging instruments has grown dramatically in the past 
twenty years. There are many ways to manage exchange rate risk (and other 
forms of risk). The most basic exchange rate hedge involves a forward or fu- 
tures contract that simply fixes the future price of a foreign currency. A slightly 
more sophisticated hedge involves an option contract that is left unexercised 
if currency movements are favorable. Further, many swap instruments allow 
firms to take advantage of differences in financing opportunities over time, 
geographic regions, and currency markets. 
Exchange rate risk management can involve simple transaction-by-trans- 
action hedging, overall balance sheet hedging, and more sophisticated hedging 
techniques that take into account the exchange rate risks that competitors face. 
Likewise, the instruments used to hedge exchange rate risks range from “plain 
vanilla” contracts to exotic derivative structures. However, the growth of deriv- 
ative markets and the use of exotic products slowed dramatically in 1995 as a 
consequence of major losses experienced by some financial and nonfinancial 
firms.I2 The notional principal outstanding of exchange-traded derivatives rose 
by less than 4 percent in 1995, compared with an average annual growth rate 
of 40 percent during the past decade. 
The Practice of Yen Exchange Rate Risk Management 
Firms are not obliged to disclose the details of their hedging practices, and 
most hedges appear as off-balance-sheet items in company  account^.'^ Further, 
as Garber (chap. 7.2 of this volume) discusses, the use of derivative products 
does not necessarily imply that firms are attempting to reduce risks. Derivative 
products can be used to speculate as well as to hedge (or to enhance) risk. The 
existing anecdotal evidence on the hedging practices of Japanese firms sug- 
gests that, rather than using financial instruments to hedge exchange rate risks, 
firms have shifted production from Japan during periods of yen appreciation. 
For example, on 9 June 1993 when the dollar had fallen to the 113-114 yen 
per dollar range, the headline on the Asian Wall Street Journal read “Most 
Japanese Firms Hold Off Hedging Their Currency Needs.” Numerous articles 
in the popular press in the past few years report that Japanese manufacturers 
12. F’rocter and Gamble and Orange County, California, are two prominent examples. 
13. In April 1994 MOF banned the use of a device known as “historic rate rollovers.” These 
allowed Japanese companies to delay taking a hit on loss-making forward currency contracts- 
agreements to buy or sell a currency at a fixed rate in the future-by selling them to friendly 
banks before they expired. The banks avoided making a loss themselves by immediately selling 
the companies new forward contracts at the same rate. This accounting trick allowed some compa- 
nies to disguise heavy losses. In 1993, e.g., Showa Shell Sekiyu, a Japanese affiliate of Royal 
DutcWShell, said it had discovered that its treasury department had covered up losses of H 6 6  
billion using this technique. The affiliate’s chairman and president subsequently resigned (Econo- 
mist, 26 March 1994,96-97). 
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have shifted production to lower cost countries, including the United States.14 
On the other hand, many explain the fact that a majority of Japanese trade is 
handled by a small number of large trading companies by the greater ability 
of the trading companies to manage exchange rate risks effectively. Trading 
companies have the advantage of economies of scale, and they may be able to 
offset risk exposure from their export business with that from imports. More- 
over, most of the respondents to Fukuda’s survey of Japanese subsidiaries in 
the United States indicated that their parent companies engage in some form 
of exchange rate risk management. 
Unfortunately, there are no aggregate data on the proportion of Japanese 
firms engaging in exchange rate risk management. But a 1996 survey of the 
use of derivatives by Japanese corporations by Nippon Life Insurance found 
that about 41 percent of the 493 corporations polled used derivative products. 
Dominguez (1998) examined the degree to which Japanese companies hedge 
by estimating their exposure to movements in the dollar using Japanese stock 
market data and an international version of the capital asset pricing model. The 
results suggest that approximately half of all publicly traded Japanese compa- 
nies are hedged against dollar exposure. 
The BIS provides survey data on the currency composition of derivative 
products typically used to manage risk. There is not necessarily a strong corre- 
lation between hedging practices and the use of a currency in derivative mar- 
kets, but information on the size of the yen derivative market indicates some- 
thing about the hedging opportunities available to Japanese firms. 
The first systematic survey of over-the-counter (OTC) and exchange-traded 
derivative markets was performed in 1995 by the BIS. Table 3.17 presents BIS 
data on the currency composition of the four main categories of OTC exchange 
rate derivative contracts: outright forwards, foreign exchange swaps, currency 
swaps, and  option^.'^ Outright forward transactions are defined as the exchange 
of two currencies for settlement more than two business days after the conclu- 
sion of the deal. Foreign exchange swaps are transactions involving the ex- 
change of two currency amounts on a specific date and a reverse exchange of 
the same amounts at a later date. A currency swap is a contract committing 
two parties to exchange streams of interest payments in different currencies for 
an agreed period of time and to exchange principal amounts in different curren- 
cies at a preagreed exchange rate at maturity. Finally, an exchange rate option 
gives the holder the right to purchase (in the case of a call) or sell (in the case 
of a put) a currency at a specified exchange rate during a specified period. The 
14. See, e.g., the article in the New York Zmes on 29 August 1993 with the headline “Japanese 
Moving Production Abroad.” 
15. Only OTC data are presented in the tables because of the low quality of the BIS exchange- 
traded data. Data from exchange-traded derivative markets were collected from OTC firms dealing 
on exchanges (rather than from the exchanges themselves) only in notional values. Total reported 
notional values outstanding on exchanges came to roughly one-quarter of the comparable OTC 
figures. 
Table 3.17 Currency Composition of Transactions in Over-the-counter Foreign Exchange Derivative Contracts, 1995 
Currency Pair 
Composition (%) 
All Instruments 
(daily average, billion US$) Outright Forwards Foreign Exchange Swaps Currency Swaps Options 
U S .  dollar against 
Total other currencies 
Deutsche mark 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
French franc 
Swiss franc 
Canadian dollar 
Australian dollar 
ECU 
Other 
Deutsche mark against 
Total other currencies other than U.S. dollar 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
French franc 
Swiss franc 
ECU 
Other 
Other currency pairs 
Total turnover 
630 
122 
169 
53 
44 
39 
27 
21 
16 
139 
39 
7 
5 
7 
3 
1 
16 
19 
688 
12 
15 
13 
10 
10 
13 
16 
9 
8 
10 
30 
41 
27 
23 
36 
40 
28 
43 
14 
82 
76 
78 
87 
85 
84 
80 
86 
92 
88 
48 
31 
44 
48 
40 
54 
58 
45 
79 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
5 
8 
8 
2 
4 
3 
4 
4 
0 
1 
21 
27 
29 
28 
24 
0 
13 
8 
6 
Source: BIS (1995, table D-8). 
Note: Data are incomplete because they do not include outstanding positions of market participants in the United Kingdom. 
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main foreign exchange hedging instrument not available in the OTC markets 
are futures contracts (and options on futures contracts), which are exclusively 
exchange traded. A futures contract is essentially the same as a forward con- 
tract, except that one party to the transaction is always the exchange, and cash 
flows are settled daily (marked to market) rather than settled at the maturity of 
the contract. 
Table 3.17 indicates that in OTC derivative contracts involving foreign ex- 
change, the yen has the second highest volume, well below that of the U.S. 
dollar, but greater than deutsche mark volume. The U.S. dollar is involved on 
one side of 92 percent of all foreign currency derivative contracts. The compa- 
rable figures for the yen and deutsche mark are 26 and 23 percent, respectively 
(BIS 1995, 30). In the exchange rate futures markets, dollar-yen contracts 
make up 3 1 percent of the market. However, OTC contracts on dollar interest 
rates represent only 27 percent of the market, followed closely by those on yen 
rates (23 percent). Moreover, yen interest rate contracts make up a relatively 
large proportion of swaps and options compared with interest rate contracts on 
other currencies. 
The geographical distribution of OTC derivative trading is similar to the dis- 
tribution of overall foreign exchange trading. Table 3.18 shows that the United 
Kingdom was the most active center, with about 30 percent of total market 
activity, and the United States and Japan the second and third most active. 
Further, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan accounted together 
for 56 percent of total trading. While Japan’s share of the derivative market 
vastly exceeds that of Germany, yen-denominated instruments account for 
roughly the same share of the market as do mark-denominated instruments. As 
in the foreign exchange market, the two centers outside of Japan in which the 
yen is relatively heavily used to denominate derivative contracts are Singapore 
and Hong Kong. 
The BIS data indicate that the market in yen-denominated derivative prod- 
ucts is substantial and that foreign exchange swaps are the most heavily traded 
of the four categories of OTC foreign exchange derivative products. This, in 
turn, suggests that Japanese firms interested in hedging dollar-yen exchange 
rate risk have ample opportunity to do so. 
One issue related to hedging opportunities is the available maturity structure 
of instruments. If trade contracts are set long in advance, then effective hedges 
may require hedging instruments with long maturities. For the OTC derivative 
products, 89 percent of forwards, foreign exchange swaps, and options are for 
products with maturities of up to one year. And among derivative products sold 
on futures exchanges, the most liquid contracts tend to be ones with maturities 
of less than six months. On the other hand, over 50 percent of currency swaps 
have maturities of one to five years, and roughly 24 percent of these contracts 
exceed five years. 
These findings raise the question of why many Japanese companies choose 
not to hedge using derivative products. Their reluctance to hedge may have 
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Table 3.18 Currency Composition of Over-the-counter Foreign Exchange Derivative 
Activity by Country and Currency, 1995 
Specified Currency against All Other Currencies 
Country Total U.S. Dollar Deutsche Mark Japanese Yen Pound Sterling ECU 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Japan 
Singapore 
Hong Kong 
Switzerland 
Gellllany 
France 
Australia 
Denmark 
Canada 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Italy 
Sweden 
Luxembourg 
Spain 
Austria 
Norway 
New Zealand 
Finland 
South Africa 
Ireland 
Greece 
Bahrain 
Portugal 
Total' 
292,422 
131,835 
112,202 
62,994 
56,391 
44,246 
45,104 
36,070 
22,902 
22,937 
18.68 1 
22,407 
15,501 
10,755 
11,800 
11,700 
11,214 
4,488 
4,193 
4,069 
2,898 
2,829 
1,726 
1,272 
1,337 
1,018 
952,993 
272,858 
122,146 
107,265 
61,518 
55,808 
39,245 
35,422 
31,613 
22,349 
19,728 
18,548 
20,562 
13,292 
9,180 
10,497 
10,495 
10,336 
3,510 
3,705 
3,917 
2,241 
2,679 
1,276 
955 
1,283 
893 
881,319 
61,818 
40,318 
13,324 
13,210 
10,868 
12,990 
30,416 
8,105 
4,225 
5,073 
1,785 
4,137 
3,695 
1,604 
2,614 
5,361 
2,118 
1,781 
665 
279 
705 
270 
479 
300 
283 
44 
226,466 
60,909 
32,987 
93,730 
18,468 
19,989 
4,000 
3,947 
4,739 
2,678 
531 
93 1 
1,714 
728 
250 
266 
46 1 
161 
59 
89 
324 
20 
104 
49 
413 
320 
103 
247,972 
46,855 
11,701 
2,138 
5,014 
4,204 
1,605 
2,306 
1,323 
2,029 
444 
633 
1,454 
1,760 
92 
171 
338 
46 
36 
115 
125 
43 
77 
346 
7 
67 
4 
82,935 
13,521 
1,454 
307 
402 
658 
866 
2,503 
253 
2,073 
436 
701 
46 
663 
116 
34 
36 
168 
12 
36 
38 
2 
51 
24,375 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Source: BIS (1995, table 9-D). 
Note: Entries are dollar-denominated volumes of derivative activity by country and currency. 
"Because two currencies are involved in each transaction, the sum of transactions in individual currencies 
comes to twice total reported turnover. 
several explanations. The first is that, while hedging opportunities exist, they 
are costly and may be perceived by company managers as too costly to justify 
the benefits. Even if managers are convinced of the value of hedging, they may 
find it difficult to justify to outsiders the purchase of derivatives in states of the 
world in which, ex post, such hedges lose money. A second reason may be that 
a company's ability to compete in domestic markets depends in part on what 
its domestic competitors do. If other Japanese firms do not hedge and the value 
of the yen changes in a way that greatly reduces the value of hedge positions, 
firms that hedge may not have the financial resources to remain competitive in 
domestic markets. 
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3.2.5 The Relation between Yen Exchange Rates 
and the Japanese Balance of Payments 
Balance-of-payments accounts provide a detailed record of the composition 
of a country’s current account balance (a country’s net exports of goods and 
services) and the transactions that finance it. There is a well-documented ten- 
dency for a country’s current account first to deteriorate and then improve, in 
a J-curve pattern, in response to a currency depreciation. The usual explanation 
for this phenomenon is that the majority of trade is contractual and contracts 
are often set long in advance of actual transfers of goods. It takes time for im- 
porters to adjust their orders in reaction to changes in relative prices, and in the 
interim, import values (as measured in domestic currency units) rise, thereby 
eroding the current account. In the case of an appreciation of the domestic 
currency, the reverse is true, with the current account initially improving and 
then deteriorating. Further, the J-curve dynamics of the current account in re- 
sponse to a change in the exchange rate are consistent with the use of the 
exporter’s currency to denominate trade contracts (Grassman’s law). For ex- 
ample, from the perspective of Germany, if most German exports are denomi- 
nated in deutsche marks and a significant fraction of German imports are de- 
nominated in foreign currencies, then when the deutsche mark appreciates, the 
deutsche mark value of export earnings is not affected whereas the deutsche 
mark price of imports falls. Consequently, even if the real value of trade is 
fixed by preset contracts,Ib the German current account improves in the short 
term when the deutsche mark strengthens. 
Japanese invoicing conventions are different. Japanese exports and imports 
are more likely to be invoiced in foreign currencies (specifically the dollar) 
than in yen, and pricing-to-market conventions are likely to lead to the mainte- 
nance of relative prices. Consequently, if the yen appreciates against the dollar, 
trade contracts are preset, and relative prices are left unchanged, the yen value 
of both exports and imports will fall. And if Japanese firms continue to main- 
tain relative prices (rather than passing through the yen appreciation), trade 
volumes are unlikely to change, further delaying the expected negative influ- 
ence of the yen appreciation on the Japanese current account. Hence, Japanese 
invoicing and pricing-to-market practices are likely to prolong the J-curve 
effect. 
An Overview of Japan’s Current and Capital Accounts 
Japan has run current account surpluses since 198 1. The ratio of Japan’s cur- 
rent account surplus to GDP reached a peak of 4.4 percent in 1986, declined to 
1.3 percent in 1990, rose again during the economic recession of 1991-93, and 
has declined as a share of GDP since that period. Table 3.19 presents data on 
16. International trade contracts are generally negotiated three to six months before goods are 
delivered and nine to twelve months before invoices are paid. 
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Table 3.19 Japanese Current Accounts and Capital Flows (billions of 
US. dollars) 
Item 1987 1989 1991 1994" 
1. Current accounts 
Trade balance 
Exports 
Imports 
Transportation 
Travel 
Investment income 
Other 
Transfers 
2. Long-tern capital 
Assets (Japanese capital) 
Service balance 
Securities 
Stocks 
Bonds 
Yen-denominated bonds 
Direct investment 
Trade credits and loans extended 
Other 
Liabilities (foreign capital) 
Securities investment 
Stocks 
Bonds 
External bonds 
Direct investment 
Trade credits and loans received 
Other 
3. Short-term capital 
4. Monetary movemenr balances 
private bank sector 
Official sector 
Foreign reserves 
5. Errors and omissionsb 
87.0 
96.4 
224.6 
128.2 
-5.7 
-6.1 
-8.7 
16.7 
-7.6 
-3.7 
- 136.5 
-132.8 
-87.8 
- 16.9 
-72.9 
2.0 
-19.5 
-16.7 
-8.8 
-3.7 
-6.1 
-42.8 
6.7 
30.1 
1.2 
-0.1 
1.3 
23.9 
29.5 
71.8 
-42.3 
-39.2 
-3.9 
57.2 
76.9 
269.6 
192.7 
-15.5 
-7.7 
- 19.3 
23.4 
-11.9 
-4.2 
-89.2 
- 192.1 
-113.2 
- 17.9 
-94.1 
-1.2 
-44.1 
-26.5 
-8.3 
102.9 
85.1 
7.0 
2.4 
75.7 
-1.1 
17.8 
1 .o 
20.8 
33.3 
8.6 
24.7 
12.8 
-22.0 
72.9 
103.0 
306.6 
203.5 
- 17.7 
- 10.5 
-20.5 
26.7 
-13.9 
- 12.5 
37.1 
-121.4 
-74.3 
-3.6 
-68.2 
-2.5 
-30.7 
-9.2 
-7.2 
158.5 
115.3 
46.8 
21.2 
47.3 
1.4 
38.1 
3.7 
-25.8 
-76.4 
-93.5 
17.1 
8.1 
-7.8 
129.1 
145.9 
384.2 
238.2 
-9.3 
- 12.6 
-27.2 
41.0 
- 10.5 
-7.5 
-82.0 
- 110.2 
-83.6 
-14.1 
-64.1 
-5.5 
- 17.9 
-3.9 
-4.7 
28.2 
34.7 
48.9 
0.5 
- 14.9 
0.9 
-9.6 
2.3 
-8.9 
- 20.4 
-22.7 
2.3 
-27.3 
-17.8 
Source: BOJ, Economic Statistics Annual (Tokyo, various issues). 
Note: Negative entries in capital and monetary movement denote outflow of capital from Japan. 
"Starting in 1995 Japan's balance-of-payments data were no longer provided in U.S. dollars. 
bErrors and omissions are defined by line 5 = -(line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 4). 
Japanese current account and capital account flows since 1987. Starting in 
1995 the BOJ stopped reporting these statistics in billions of dollars, but trends 
in these accounts have been stable since 1994. The largest component of the 
current account is the trade balance, and the figures reported in table 3.19 
show that import growth has outstripped export growth, explaining the slower 
growth of the Japanese current account surplus in recent years. 
In the late 1980s Japan's imports of long-term net assets (line 2 in table 3.19) 
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exceeded the current account surplus, the difference being made up by short- 
term capital (line 3). In other words, Japan financed long-term investment by 
borrowing short-term capital. In 1991, despite continued current account sur- 
pluses, there was an outflow of long-term and short-term capital. Ito (1994) 
describes this as the “unwinding” of capital; basically Japan repaid the short- 
term debt it had accumulated in the second half of the 1980s. By 1994 long- 
term capital was again flowing into Japan, but these assets no longer exceeded 
the current account surplus, so that Japan exported short-term capital. Further, 
the switch in the long-term capital account to outflow in 1991 seems to have 
been mainly caused by the investment decisions of foreigners. Foreign capital 
liabilities exceeded Japanese capital assets in 1991, but by 1994 this pattern 
had reversed itself. Looking further at the cause of the capital outflows in the 
early 1990s, it appears that foreign investment was concentrated in Japanese 
securities. In 1994 foreign investment in stocks rose marginally from their 
1991 levels, but net foreign investment in Japanese bonds fell dramatically, 
presumably due to the low yields on Japanese bonds. 
Implications of Yen Invoicing Practices for the J-Curve 
It is difficult to reconcile the persistent Japanese current account surpluses 
documented in table 3.19 with the dramatic appreciation of the yen relative to 
the dollar (and most other major currencies) in the past decade. An increase in 
the value of a currency does not guarantee that the current account balance of 
the issuing country will deteriorate, but the expectation is that, over time, its 
export goods will become less competitive on world markets. There are, how- 
ever, at least three reasons why export prices denominated in yen may take 
longer to rise in reaction to a yen strengthening. The first reason is the pricing- 
to-market behavior of Japanese manufacturing firms. The second reason is the 
foreign currency invoicing practices of Japanese firms. As described earlier, 
pricing-to-market behavior does not explain Japanese invoicing conventions, 
but in combination with invoicing conventions, this practice is likely to 
dampen the effect of any yen appreciation on Japanese export prices. The third 
reason is that, if Japanese firms hedge against yen appreciation, the costs of 
exports and imports will not be influenced by changes in the value of the yen. 
When domestic firms attempt to maintain foreign market shares and trade 
invoices are denominated in foreign currencies, an appreciation of the domestic 
currency is likely to influence export prices even more slowly than in the stan- 
dard J-curve dynamic. Of course, eventually, if domestic firms are to stay in 
business and the currency appreciation continues, export prices must rise. Con- 
sequently, any effect of pricing-to-market, currency invoicing, and hedging is 
inherently short run. In the long run we should expect the Japanese current 
account surplus to fall in reaction to any yen appreciation, and the Japanese 
balance-of-payments statistics suggest that this process has begun. 
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Long-Term versus Short-Term Capital Outflows from Japan 
The large Japanese current account surpluses should foster the international- 
ization of the yen. Japanese financial institutions benefit from opportunities to 
invest the large accumulated surplus. However, the extent to which the current 
account surpluses have enhanced the role of the yen depends on how short- 
and long-term capital outflows have been invested. This section examines the 
portfolio preferences of Japanese institutional investors, the role of the Japa- 
nese banks in providing yen denominated liquidity, and the destination of Japa- 
nese foreign direct investment. 
The Porgolio Preferences of Japanese Institutional Investors 
The data in table 3.19 indicate that long-term capital outflows from Japan 
have been concentrated in securities, and most of these foreign securities are 
held by Japanese institutional investors (banks, insurance companies, and in- 
vestment trusts). Table 3.20 presents data on the shares of foreign security hold- 
ings of institutional investors in Japan as compared to institutional investors in 
other countries. The portfolios of institutional investors in Japan, along with 
those of investors in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, are far more 
internationally diversified than U.S. portfolios.17 The currency composition of 
Japanese foreign security holdings are not available, but Fukao and Okina 
(1989) present data from the late 1980s showing that 57 percent of life insur- 
ance portfolios (which account for 33 percent of Japanese foreign security in- 
vestments) were denominated in U.S. dollars and 22 percent were denominated 
in Canadian dollars. Further, according to Fukao and Okina (1989,202), as of 
the late 1980s only about one-third of foreign security investment by Jap- 
anese institutional investors was covered by forward transactions or matching 
foreign currency liabilities. Consequently, institutional investors were an im- 
portant channel of uncovered capital outflows from Japan. 
The Role of Japanese Banks 
What role do Japanese banks play in recycling Japanese current account 
surpluses? Tavlas and Ozeki (1992) argued that Japanese banks have not acted 
like world bankers, transforming liquid yen-denominated deposits into longer 
term yen-denominated loans and investments. Instead, Japanese banks have 
been involved mainly in maturity transformation, borrowing short-term funds 
overseas in foreign currencies and investing funds in long-term foreign- 
currency-denominated instruments. Prudential regulations limit the net foreign 
exchange exposure of Japanese banks. So that, while Japanese banks hold a 
17. Japan conducted a series of deregulations of foreign investment by financial institutions in 
the 1980s. A brief chronology of these is provided in Fukao and Okina (1989, app. b). Although 
this deregulation clearly provided Japanese institutional investors greater opportunities to invest 
abroad, it is likely that the large scale of investment was due in large part to the high real interest 
rates in the United States in the 1980s. 
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Table 3.20 Foreign Security Investments by Institutional Investors across 
Countries (percent) 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1991 
United States 
Private pension fundsa 
Japan 
Life insurance companies 
Non-life insurance companies 
Trust accounts of banks 
Postal Life Insurance 
Norinchukin Bank 
Canada 
Life insurance companies 
Pension funds 
Italy 
Life insurance companies 
United Kingdomb 
Life insurance companies 
Pension funds 
Belgium 
Insurance companies and pension funds 
Netherlands 
Insurance companies 
Private pension funds 
Public pension funds 
Sverden 
Insurance companies 
1 .o 3.0 4.2 5.2 
9.0 
7.4 
2.2 
0.0 
4.3 
26.4 
19.4 
14.0 
6.7 
10.3 
30.0 
29.1 
19.4 
14.0 
22.7 
28.4 
28.5 
22.1 
12.1 
32.6 
2.1 
6.1 
2.2 
6.6 
2.3 
6.0 
2.7 
7.6 
11.7 10.1 11.6 9.7 
6.9 
6.1 
17.3 
17.8 
20.7 
23.6 
1.7 3.3 3.3 
5 2  
lo.@ 
1.7’ 
10.3 
13.8 
2.8 
9.3 
21.1 
5.2 
10.3 
23.5 
5.7 
1 Sd 10.4 12.5 
Source: Takeda and Turner (1992). 
Note; Entries are percentages of institutional capital invested in foreign securities. 
”Tax-exempt funded schemes (excluding individual retirement accounts). 
bPension funds exclude central government sector but include other public sector. Unit trust invest- 
ment is allocated as follows: 50 percent at the end of 1989 (on the basis of partial survey results), 
other years calculated in proportion to changes in the measured share of foreign assets. 
c1983 figure. 
“987 figure. 
large number of foreign securities, these tend to be financed by foreign cur- 
rency liabilities to avoid currency risks. 
The data reported in table 3.21 show that prior to 1991 external assets of 
authorized foreign exchange banks were predominantly in foreign currencies 
(mostly U S .  dollars) rather than in yen. Starting in 1992 external yen-denom- 
inated assets exceeded those denominated in foreign currencies. Nevertheless, 
the fact that Japanese banks heavily borrow and lend in foreign currencies 
means that they provide limited yen-denominated liquidity to the financial 
markets. The combined evidence in tables 3.20 and 3.21 suggests that it is 
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Table 3.21 External Assets of Authorized Foreign Exchange Banks 
Level (billion US$) Composition (%) 
1985 1990 1996 1985 1990 1996 
Foreign currency denominated 77.9 344.8 400.2 78 56 44 
Yen denominated 21.7 268.4 500.9 22 44 56 
Total 99.6 613.2 901.1 100 100 100 
Source: MOF, Economic Sfatisfics Monrhly (various issues). 
Note: The 1996 figures, reported in millions of yen, are translated into dollars at the average 1996 
exchange rate: 115.98 yen per dollar. 
Table 3.22 Japanese Foreign Direct Investment by Region (percent) 
CounhyRegion 1985 1990 1992 1993 1994 1996‘ 
Asia 11.7 12.4 18.8 18.4 23.1 19.9 
(billion US$) (1.4) (7.1) (6.4) (6.6) (9.7) n.a. 
Europeb 15.8 25.1 20.7 22.0 15.2 n.a. 
United States 44.2 45.9 40.5 40.8 42.2 45.2 
Otherc 28.3 16.6 20.0 18.8 19.0 n.a. 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Nihon Statistical Association, Japan Statistical Yearbook (various issues). Original data 
are from MOF, International Finance Bureau; 1996 data are from Nihon Keizai Shinbusha, Japan 
Economic Almanac (1997). 
“Fiscal year through March 1996; Japanese foreign direct investment in Asia totaled Y1.19 trillion 
in March 1996. 
bExcluding Luxembourg. 
‘Includes the following tax havens: the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Netherlands 
Antilles, Luxembourg, and Panama. 
Japanese institutional investors, rather than Japanese banks, who have played 
the largest role in recycling Japanese current account surpluses and facilitating 
the international use of the yen. 
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment 
Japan’s foreign direct investment (line 2 in table 3.19) is a substantial com- 
ponent of long-term capital flows. Japanese foreign investments are defined as 
“direct” if Japanese owners control 10 percent or more of the foreign firm in 
which investment is located.ls In 1994 direct investment was 16 percent of 
Japanese long-term capital. Table 3.22 presents data on the destinations of Jap- 
anese direct  investment^.'^ The share of Japanese investment in the United 
18. Prior to 1 December 1979 Japanese foreign investment was considered “direct” if Japanese 
owners controlled 25 percent or more of the foreign firms. 
19. Japanese foreign direct investment data are notoriously unreliable. Weinstein (1997) pointed 
out that foreign direct investment entries are recorded not on the date of investment but on the date 
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States has been remarkably stable over the years; just under half of Japanese 
foreign direct investment each year goes to the United States. A significant 
fraction of Japanese direct investment goes to Asia, and starting in 1994 invest- 
ments in Asia surpassed funds bound for Europe. The yen appreciation against 
the dollar in the mid- 1990s heightened the attractiveness of foreign direct in- 
vestment for Japanese firms. Japanese manufacturing firms, in particular, have 
been strengthening production networks in countries with cheaper labor and 
procurement costs. 
History suggests that direct investment, especially in developing countries, 
can enhance the international role of a currency. British direct investment in de- 
veloping countries in the second half of the nineteenth century and U.S. direct 
investment in reconstructing countries after World War I1 led to the buildup of 
large external pound- and dollar-denominated balances. In the case of Japan, 
direct investment in Asia, and especially China in the past few years,*O is sub- 
stantial, but direct investment to developing countries overall makes up a rela- 
tively small share of net capital outflows. So that, with the possible exception 
of Asia, Japanese foreign direct investment is unlikely to lead to significant 
external yen-denominated balances. 
The Role of Bank of Japan Foreign Exchange Rate Intervention Operations 
A final measure of a currency’s international role is its use by central banks 
to intervene in foreign exchange markets. Foreign exchange interventions are 
typically defined as official sales or purchases of foreign assets against domes- 
tic assets in the foreign exchange market for the purpose of influencing relative 
currency values. The BOJ actively intervenes in the foreign exchange market, 
and most BOJ operations involve the yen. Other than the BOJ, however, the 
only central bank that regularly intervenes using the yen is the Fed. In recent 
years the Fed has typically divided its interventions equally between the yen 
and the mark. Although, on some occasions, especially in 1995 when the yen- 
dollar rate was the focus of intervention operations, Fed interventions were ex- 
clusively against the yen. The dollar is the predominant intervention currency 
used by developing country central banks. Intervention within the EMS is car- 
ried out exclusively in European currencies. And non-EMS-related interven- 
tions by the German Bundesbank typically involve the dollar. 
Although no data exist on the relative use of currencies in official interven- 
tions, the yen is likely to rank well behind the dollar, and perhaps the deutsche 
mark. Moreover, daily foreign exchange intervention operations by the G-3 
countries are typically under $200 million. Therefore, even were the use of the 
of acceptance by MOF (the 1980 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law requires firms 
to notify MOF prior to the investment). There is often a time lag between time of MOF acceptance 
and the cash disbursement. Further, the entire value of multiple-year investments are recorded on 
the MOF acceptance date. 
20. Japanese direct investment in China jumped 61 percent in 1995 toW31.9 billion. 
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yen in intervention operations to increase dramatically, such operations are 
unlikely to have much impact on the international role of the yen. 
3.2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
The role of the yen in international financial markets has greatly expanded 
in the past two decades. International use of yen was tightly controlled by Japa- 
nese authorities prior to the mid-l970s, but since that time Japanese financial 
markets and institutions have been significantly deregulated. Likewise, the 
yen’s purchasing power has remained strong and relatively stable over the past 
two decades. 
Although use of the yen as a medium of exchange, a reserve currency, and 
an investment currency has grown substantially since the early 1980s, the U.S. 
dollar and the German mark remain the dominant international currencies. 
Moreover, few trade contracts are denominated in yen, in spite of rising Japa- 
nese economic power in world trade. This paper explored a number of possible 
explanations for low yen invoice ratios, including Japanese pricing-to-market 
behavior. But as long as Japanese firms hedge exchange rate risks that arise 
when trade is invoiced in foreign currencies, pricing-to-market behavior does 
not rely on the use of particular invoice currencies. Further, BIS data indicate 
that the market for yen-denominated derivative products is substantial, sug- 
gesting that Japanese firms interested in hedging yen-dollar exchange rate risk 
have ample opportunity to do so. Hence, there remains a puzzle as to why Ja- 
pan is an outlier among the G-6 in its trade invoicing practices. 
Japanese invoicing practices may be partly responsible for observed J- 
curves. If the yen appreciates against the dollar, trade contracts are preset, and 
relative prices are left unchanged, then the yen value of both Japanese exports 
and imports will fall. And if the fall in the value of imports outweighs that in 
exports, the yen appreciation will lead to an improvement in the Japanese cur- 
rent account. However, the influence of currency invoicing on the J-curve is 
inherently short run; over time, if Japanese firms are to stay in business, and 
the currency appreciation continues, export prices must rise. Over the long run, 
Japanese current account surpluses will fall in reaction to a yen appreciation- 
and Japanese balance-of-payments statistics suggest that this process has be- 
gun. 
Large and persistent Japanese current account surpluses serve to enhance 
the internationalization of the yen. Interestingly, it appears to be Japanese insti- 
tutional investors, rather than Japanese banks, who have played the largest role 
in recycling Japanese current account surpluses and facilitating the interna- 
tional use of the yen. However, foreign investments by Japanese institutional 
investors, as well as Japanese foreign direct investments, have predominantly 
gone to the United States, where the share of yen balances remains relatively 
small. The only region in which large external yen-denominated balances have 
begun to build is Asia. 
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The evidence suggests that there is little reason to expect international use 
of the yen to increase substantially from current levels. The United States and 
Germany have, over the past decade, established records of low inflation and 
deregulated their financial markets, thereby strengthening the positions of their 
currencies. The U.S. dollar, in particular, appears to be widely used in part due 
to its history as a vehicle currency. Moreover, introduction of the euro at the 
end of the decade is likely to establish a competitor to the yen even stronger 
than the current deutsche mark. Consequently, to the extent that the limited in- 
ternational role of the yen may be puzzling, this puzzle is unlikely to disappear 
any time soon. 
Appendix 
Survey Questions: The Currency Invoicing Practices of 
Japanese Corporations 
I. Corporate Policy on Invoicing 
In your firm, how is it decided in which currency to invoice exports and imports? 
Is there a concrete policy (decision rules)? 
Is there any Japanese government, central bank, or MITI policy on this 
subject? If so, what are they? Are they mandatory? Discretionary? 
Who is responsible for this policy, your firm or your headquarters? (level 
within the company/name) 
Is there any management discretion in making the determination? At what 
level in the company? 
11. Factors That Determine Currency Denomination of Invoicing 
In your firm, on what basis is the invoicing currency determined? 
Does the determination depend on countries on the other side, type of 
product, timing, or other condition(s) in making the choice? 
As for imports you may handle as a trading company, how is the invoicing 
currency determined? Which currency is your firm in the United States 
using to invoice exports and imports to and from headquarters or Japa- 
nese firms? 
If U.S. dollar denomination is being used instead of yen, what is the rea- 
son? Why isn’t the yen used? Which currency is your headquarters in 
Japan using to deal with U.S. firms? If it is using U.S. dollar denomina- 
tions, what is the reason? 
Must the billed and billing party agree in advance on the invoicing cur- 
rency? 
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A. Inflation and Currency Fluctuations 
Does the relative inflation performance of alternative currencies enter into the 
invoicing decision process? 
If so, are there minimums, baselines, or floors? 
Who determines them and what are they? 
Is past or prospective exchange rate volatility a factor in the invoicing decision? 
B. Price Competition 
Does your firm attempt to stabilize the price of your export products measured 
Does your firm invoice in foreign currency in order to maintain a constant 
in the buyer’s currency? 
markup over invoice price? 
C. Taxation 
Are there tax reasons to prefer one invoicing currency to another? 
Are these tax reasons unique to the business or trading company? 
Does the type of product have a bearing (special tax treatment)? 
Does the paired company or nation for billing have an effect? 
Do you have an advanced pricing agreement on transfer prices (between your 
firm and headquarters) with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service? If so, why? 
If not, why not? 
Is some of the ownership of your company located in a tax haven (low tax) 
country? Or does your parent company in Japan hold 100 percent owner- 
ship? 
What determines whether you reinvest your profits or remit them as dividends? 
How important are tax considerations in that decision? 
111. Hedging Foreign Exchange Risk 
When you do invoice in foreign currencies, do you hedge the consequent for- 
Does your company participate in currency hedging operations? Is this 
How does your company decide if currency hedging is necessary? 
Are there time limits associated with hedging-out 30, 60, 90 days? 
More? 
If you hedge, do you hedge on an individual transaction (or contract) basis 
or for a bulk value of sales over a particular period? 
Do you use derivative products for hedging or only forward currency con- 
tracts? If you use derivative products, what kind of products do you 
generally use? For 100 percent of the risk? How and who decides? 
Do you generally borrow from your parent company or from foreign lenders? 
Does the currency in which you borrow influence your invoicing prefer- 
ences? 
eign exchange risk? 
your responsibility or is it done elsewhere in the company? 
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IV. Factors That Might Lead to Changes in Current Invoicing Policy 
What factors would lead your firm to change the invoicing currency denomina- 
tion of your products? 
What factors might lead you to invoice more in yen? 
What factors might lead you to invoice more in foreign currency? 
Has your company’s invoicing policy for exports or imports changed re- 
Do you foresee any changes to the current invoicing policies in the near 
cently? 
future? 
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3. Moeen Qureshi 
Capital Flows and the East Asian Financial Crisis 
Let me try to follow in Michael Blumenthal's (chap. 2.2) footsteps by saying that 
what I am going to give you is the perspective of someone who, at least these 
days, is a practical operator. I remember Keynes's dictum that all practical men 
are the slaves of some defunct economist. With apologies to that unknown 
defunct economist, let me start with a thumbnail sketch of what has happened in 
terms of capital flows to East Asia, and in that connection, I want to thank Taka- 
toshi It0 for providing an excellent background paper. It encompasses most of 
the major problems, as well as most of the data that one really needs. 
In very brief terms, there has been a sixfold increase in total capital flows to 
the emerging markets in the 1990s. All of the increase has been in private cap- 
ital flows. In 1996 these amounted to $265 billion, if you include Korea. Offi- 
cial capital flows dwindled to less than $10 billion last year. East Asia has ab- 
sorbed more than one-half of total private capital flows. East Asia and, within 
East Asia, China have had the lion's share of these resources. 
The next important point is that there has been a major change in the struc- 
ture of capital flows, with foreign direct investment now accounting for almost 
one-half of total private capital flows (prior to 1990, about two-thirds of private 
capital flows were essentially commercial bank lending). East Asia has been 
receiving, therefore, a great deal more than its proportionate share. This grow- 
ing share of foreign direct investment has helped bring in new technology and 
modernization. 
Why has East Asia been so favored? My own, perhaps simplistic, answer to 
that is the following: 
First, East Asia has enjoyed political stability for almost the past two de- 
cades. Whenever new governments have come in-and some new govern- 
ments have come in-they have not reneged on the promises of previous gov- 
ernments, and therefore, essentially all contractual agreements reached with 
foreign investors have been maintained and continued. 
Second, over the past two decades, the region has had macroeconomic sta- 
bility. 
Third, the environment has been very investor friendly. 
Fourth, and in my view perhaps most important, the governments of this 
region have been totally dedicated to economic development as a primary ob- 
jective of policy. And they have recognized that they could only achieve this 
objective by liberalizing their economies and integrating them with the global 
economy. And they have actively pursued this goal. 
I recall talking with the leaders of China, in fact with the prime minister of 
China, about eight or nine years ago. He told me that they had reached a collec- 
tive decision to assign the highest priority to the task of economic growth, with 
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the objective of achieving a standard of living comparable to that of the Japa- 
nese within a space of perhaps a quarter-century. And in order not to be dis- 
tracted from achieving that objective, they intended to move swiftly to resolve 
their outstanding territorial disputes with the then Soviet Union and with India. 
And they proceeded to do so. In the process, they gave up an enormous amount 
of territory that had been in dispute with the Soviet Union for nearly a quarter- 
century. Similarly, their forces withdrew from the border with India, and they 
tried to settle that dispute as well. 
If you look at the history of Southeast Asia, a similar sense of dedication to 
development can be observed in the other countries. I have had a modest role in 
trying to contribute to that objective-a very modest role-basically by or- 
ganizing a fund that provides direct investment for infrastructure projects in 
Asia. 
But how has this favorable picture changed? Over the past two months, East 
Asia has changed from the preferred destination for private foreign capital to 
the epicenter of a major financial and currency crisis. The East Asian countries 
have recently experienced a precipitous decline in currency values. I was just 
told that the Malaysian market fell further because of some of the steps the 
authorities have taken to restrict the freedom of market transactions. They have 
also seen a massive reversal of capital flows during this period. Why has this 
occurred? 
Except in Thailand, the reason is not really a failure of macroeconomic pol- 
icy. In a recent World Bank study of private capital flows that examined the 
impact of the Mexican crisis on other emerging markets, the authors extolled 
the virtues of the macroeconomic policies of the Asian tigers. The report 
pointed to the rapid rate of economic growth achieved together with overall 
monetary and fiscal stability and explained that this was the reason these econ- 
omies were not much affected by the Mexican crisis. 
More recently, attention has gravitated-some of the background papers 
make this very clear-to problems in the financial sector as the central issue. 
They seem to have triggered the crisis. These problems include, of course, the 
poor regulatory framework. They also include the excessive, and often specula- 
tive, involvement of financial institutions in intermediating capital flows. 
In my view, while financial sector deficiencies have certainly contributed 
to-and aggravated-the financial crisis in East Asia, these deficiencies have 
existed for a long time. They have been known for a very long time, and the 
markets have happily ignored them, also for a very long time. I lean toward 
Paul Krugman’s view, expressed in his excellent paper on currency crises 
(chap. 8.1), that foreign exchange crises typically occur, at least in today’s envi- 
ronment of massive capital movements, not when economic fundamentals sud- 
denly change, but when for one reason or another-whether it be an economic 
reason or a political reason, such as the issue of succession in Indonesia or of 
leadership in Malaysia-currencies suddenly look vulnerable. That is when 
crises most often occur. 
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Like others here, I was at the recent annual meetings of the IMF and the 
World Bank in Hong Kong. The issue of Southeast Asia’s currency crisis was 
clearly in the forefront of discussions there. What really dominated the talk on 
the cocktail circuit-where most of the business gets done at these meetings- 
was the confrontation between Mahathir and George Soros. On one side, Ma- 
hathir blamed all Malaysia’s troubles on Western speculators and manipulators 
and alleged that Western governments are behind their machinations. He iden- 
tified George Soros as the real devil who had manipulated the market. On the 
other side, most Western observers claimed that the source of Asia’s problem 
lay squarely at home. Soros put it bluntly: he said Mahathir was a menace to 
his country, and all Malaysia’s problems were entirely due to Mahathir and his 
policies. What certainly is true is that Mahathir‘s pronouncements have not 
helped. Every time he makes a speech, the ringgit falls. 
However, if this was all there was to the debate, it could be characterized as 
a confrontation between two very flamboyant and rather egocentric people. But 
there is more important fallout from this crisis. This crisis has substantial polit- 
ical and economic implications for the region, and it has already seriously 
damaged the growth and economic prospects of some Asian countries. If you 
look at the opportunity costs in terms of economic growth foregone, it runs to 
trillions of dollars. Therefore, we must understand the issues involved and their 
judicious management if we are going to continue to move toward globaliza- 
tion and liberalization of capital flows-the kind of liberalization that the IMF 
would like to achieve by modifying its Articles of Agreement. 
Unfortunately, the debate has become polarized, between those who, to use 
Camdessus’s phrase, are seeking to demonize free capital and currency markets 
and those who are seeking to portray them as the epitome of perfection. Of 
course, neither of these perspectives is correct. As Paul Krugman says in his 
paper, there have been, in the past six or seven years, three crises, in Europe, 
in Latin America, and in Asia; and prior to each crisis, it was well known that 
there were latent financial problems in the particular countries affected. But 
when the crisis came, it came very suddenly, and it came with herdlike behav- 
ior among investors. 
There is also the issue of contagion. It is hard to see why, during the Mexican 
crisis, Thailand‘s stock market should be affected. It is equally hard to see why 
Indonesia should be so greatly affected by the Thai crisis. No country is per- 
fect, but Indonesia’s economic fundamentals are about the strongest you can 
find in a developing country today. 
All this is to say that foreign exchange markets are really not as efficient as 
they are presumed to be, and if this is the point that Mahathir is trying to make, 
then he’s absolutely right: there are indeed imperfections in market behavior. 
However, the fact forgotten in the East Asian context is that whether markets 
are efficient or not, it is precisely by tapping the vast resources of global capi- 
tal, and the associated technology, that a country such as Malaysia advances to 
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its current stage of economic development and modernization. And the same 
is true of the other East Asian countries. In this context Mahathir’s inclination 
to go back to a system of capital and currency controls is tantamount to giving 
up the source from which the international community and the East Asian re- 
gion have derived such great benefits. 
I think Mahathir is right, though, that capital flows today are so large, and 
the contagion effects can be so rapid and so overwhelming, that even countries 
with sound policies can see much of their good work go down the drain when a 
crisis comes. He is also right when he says that small countries are particularly 
vulnerable to this type of economic disruption, and to use his phrase, it is dif- 
ficult to establish a level playing field when you have a fight between a giant and 
a midget. 
Moreover, it would be wrong to dismiss the political import of Mahathir’s 
statement. Asia, too, has its protectionist lobby, which harbors a sneaking ad- 
miration for the David and Goliath type of confrontation at which Mahathir ex- 
cels. It was no accident that despite his support for free markets, Li Peng, the 
Chinese prime minister, found it necessary to express some sympathy with Ma- 
hathir’s position. 
Now what can be done about managing these currency crises and, in the fu- 
ture, perhaps preventing them? The economist’s answer is to go to freely float- 
ing rates. I am in no sense an advocate of fixed exchange rates, but having had 
some experience in managing a country for a certain period of time, I can tell 
you that giving total primacy to a policy of freely floating exchange rates cre- 
ates such conflicts with domestic economic objectives that, politically, most gov- 
ernments cannot sustain such policies for any length of time. 
Others have asserted that Asian markets should develop shock absorbers and 
mechanisms to respond to instability. But the remedies suggested are the same 
ones: financial sector reforms and fiscal flexibility. While these are obviously 
desirable, it is difficult to see how they would prevent, or even substantially 
mitigate, the kind of crises that currently affect the Asian countries. Selective 
capital controls are slightly more effective; but they’re controversial, and they 
raise the specter of governments all too easily retreating into a world of con- 
trols. 
At the recent IMF/World Bank meetings, a proposal that I thought very con- 
structive was unfortunately sidelined, if not completely torpedoed: that of try- 
ing to put together a regional fund. It was torpedoed by fears that the IMF’s turf 
was being invaded. Unfortunately also, this proposal was handled extremely 
clumsily by its promoters. However, I can tell you that no Asian leader whom 
I talked with-and I talked with several-intended to exclude the IMF, or the 
United States, from such a regional fund. Quite the contrary. Nor was there any 
intention, especially on the part of Japan, which was one of the leaders of this 
particular proposal, to make it into an “unconditional” facility. 
The United States and the Chinese, in particular, were scared by this pro- 
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posal because they thought the Japanese were trying to create a yen-denom- 
inated zone in which they could rule the roost. The Asian proponents of the 
proposal felt that the decisions of the fund would tend to be dominated by 
two or three countries. Since the Asians would be contributing the bulk of the 
resources, they should have a bigger say in the way the fund is operated. There 
are precedents to establishing such facilities; it has been done in Europe in the 
form of the General Agreement to Borrow. In any event, the Asian countries 
do wish to work closely with the IMF. Perhaps the best thing would be to have 
the IMF manage such a facility, and perhaps APEC could also be given some 
role in it because it has little else to do that is substantive. 
My personal preference-and it would be delightful to organize it-would 
be for the private sector to try to put together an insurance fund. Indeed, I’d like 
to fly this kite a little bit higher: It is about time that we get the governments to 
move out of the way on some of these major financial issues and let the private 
sector handle them. Of course, the governments would have to cooperate. If 
you look at the East Asian region, you’ve got $500 to $600 billion in reserves 
among the Southeast Asian countries. You could easily pledge 10 percent of 
these reserves to provide collateral for such a fund. With that kind of financial 
support, it would not be difficult to get some business leaders to put together a 
fund that would be available to foreign investors in times of financial crisis. 
This is just one additional idea to titillate the imagination of some of my 
friends here, particularly those from official circles. 
I think that the current situation, in which it is virtually impossible for a 
country to restore confidence and get out of a crisis without the IMF stepping 
in and putting its seal of good housekeeping on it, is very dangerous. Since the 
markets have only a vague, or somewhat confused, idea as to what is wrong 
with the country to begin with, everything now depends on the IMF’s coming 
in and pouring its holy water over the country. Thus the country gets religion- 
and unless this happens, it is impossible to put Humpty Dumpty together again. 
In a broader context, we must recognize that today more financial trans- 
actions are done outside the framework of national regulatory standards than 
within. Therefore, we should not be surprised if the excessive volatility that 
characterizes the system is often disruptive, rather than constructive. Accord- 
ingly, I think that there is a very important, more activist role for the IMF, and 
possibly for the International Trade Organization: to begin to evolve interna- 
tional standards and procedures for banks and financial institutions that operate 
in the international arena. I believe this process has already begun. 
Reverting to Southeast Asia, my conclusion is that, like most issues that 
create conflict, the Asian issue is a combination of money, real estate, and poli- 
tics. If you focus on the first, strictly limit the second, and completely avoid 
the third-that is, avoid politicizing the issue-you should do all right. 
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4. Zhang Shengman 
As globalization continues, the world's production and trading patterns will 
undergo fundamental change. In this inevitable process, capital flows will play 
a central role. Indeed, looking ahead, if there are constraints to further rapid 
growth of such flows, they are not likely to be found on the supply side due to 
the likelihood of continued moderate interest rates in the industrial countries, 
the increasing competitive pressures limiting the margin of potential return to 
capital, and the small share of portfolios that emerging markets still represent. 
Constraints are more likely to be found on the demand side, where there is a 
question about the capacity of developing countries to attract, absorb, and 
manage these flows. 
In this context, given the crisis in Thailand and its contagion effect on other 
Southeast Asian economies, it would be highly relevant to continue thinking 
about some of the questions raised, such as why the crisis was not avoided, 
since it was largely foreseen; how a crisis like this could happen in one of the 
world's most dynamic centers of investment and growth; and why the crisis 
was as contagious as it was in countries with some of the strongest fundamen- 
tals. Of course, there is no shortage of suspects-as already cited by various 
parties. These include a significant currency appreciation, a large current ac- 
count deficit, increasing reliance on short-term borrowings, the authorities' de- 
lay in responding, and so on. 
These possible causes are, of course, all relevant, interconnected, and cumu- 
lative in the sense they all contributed in some way to the collapse in confi- 
dence that is the stark characteristic of the crisis. What is sobering, however, 
is the fact that many of the same factors played a role in the Mexican crisis 
some two and a half years earlier. Indeed, one could say with reasonable cer- 
tainty that the crisis in Thailand was due to a combination of cyclical and 
structural factors, three of them being particularly noteworthy. 
The first factor is the remarkable deceleration of exports during the twenty 
months prior to the onset of the crisis. The deceleration appears to be at least 
in part a reflection of more deep-seated problems of competitiveness than just 
the exchange rate appreciation. One could argue that a very large current ac- 
count deficit, which implies very rapid growth in net foreign liabilities, need 
not worry the markets if exports are growing just as rapidly, but the markets 
would worry if exports are not keeping pace. Clearly, the coupling of unexpect- 
edly weak export performance and a large current account deficit raised basic 
questions about the sustainability of the country's external position, especially 
when much of the buildup in liabilities took the form of short-term borrowing. 
A second factor is the precarious state of the financial system linked to the 
political economy of the country. According to Goldman, Sachs, the Thai sys- 
tem scored worst on a set of factors believed to contribute to banking crises in 
the region. In particular, credit expanded very rapidly in relation to GDP, and 
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the size of bank loans relative to GDP in the country is one of the highest in a 
large sample of countries-suggesting that problems in the banking system 
could have especially severe repercussions. In fact, from 1993 to 1996, domes- 
tic credit to the private sector grew by more than 20 percent annually. Accord- 
ing to Lewis Preston, the former president of J. P. Morgan and of the World 
Bank, continued annual growth of more than 15 percent for a financial institu- 
tion is a recipe for disaster. 
The third factor I would like to cite is the perception in the markets that the 
determination, urgency, and sophistication needed for a quick and adequate 
policy response was lacking on the part of the government, resulting in greater 
loss of market confidence. Indeed, by some accounts, there was a lag of more 
than six months between the onset of the confidence problems and the initia- 
tion of policy actions. This then may be one area where market perceptions 
differ from those that followed the crisis in Latin America several years ago. 
When one analyzes the Thai and Mexican crises, one common conclusion 
is that continuous large capital inflows place enormous demands on the capac- 
ity of regulatory institutions and the soundness of macroeconomic policies. 
Even if some aspects of the system are solid (in Thailand, a very high rate of 
domestic saving and investment), a crisis can still be precipitated by the weaker 
links of the chain. As is said, the team is only as strong as the weakest member. 
While it is too early to provide a certain set of prescriptive answers to the 
Thai crisis, it is, nevertheless, clear that notwithstanding the growing complex- 
ity associated with economic development in an increasingly integrated world 
economy, fundamentals remain of fundamental importance. Indeed, if any- 
thing, more so than ever before. To successfully manage the size, composition, 
and probably the direction of capital flows, appropriate and sound macroeco- 
nomic policies are indispensable. 
With this backdrop, let me now turn to China, the largest recipient of capital 
flows in the developing world during the past four years. I will talk briefly 
about three aspects in this regard: the path China has traveled so far, how China 
has managed the large flows, and the challenges China still faces. 
The Path China Has Traveled So Far 
China formally adopted the open-door policy in 1979, and the first joint 
venture with foreign partners was set up in 1980, that is, seventeen years ago. 
Since then, the country has gone through basically three phases in the way it 
attracts capital flows. 
The “mutual learning” period took place from 1979 to 1986. Just as China 
was ignorant, so investors were afraid. It was a period of getting to know each 
other and learning from each other. It is no wonder that practically all flows 
were from Hong Kong and Macao going largely to adjacent southern China. 
Furthermore, these limited flows financed mostly simple processing ventures. 
The “getting ready” phase took place from 1987 to 1991. During this period, 
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essential laws and regulations were enacted and attractive incentive measures 
adopted. The result was a fair, but gradual, expansion both in the number of 
economic sectors and of geographic locations into which flows were directed. 
However, the amount remained small; the scale of individual ventures was not 
large, nor was the level of technology transferred high. 
The “rapid increase” period started in 1992 and continues, partly accompa- 
nying the rapid transformation of China’s planned economy to increasingly a 
market economy and partly benefiting from the worldwide surge in private 
sector investment in emerging markets. The achievement in this period has 
been remarkable, as we all know. Suffice it to say that as much as 85 percent 
of total capital inflows have occurred during this period. Indeed, as of now 
there are more than 300,000 ventures involving foreign flows, close to the num- 
ber of existing state-owned enterprises, with more than 140,000 already in op- 
eration. Almost $500 billion has been committed, with over $200 billion actu- 
ally used-$53 billion in 1995 and $42 billion in 1996 alone-coming from 
over 160 countries and areas. Foreign direct investment (FDI) ventures- 
which employ 18 million people-now account for almost half of China’s mer- 
chandise foreign trade and 10 percent of government tax revenue. Finally, of 
the 500 largest multinational corporations (MNCs), about 300 have ventures 
of various kinds in China, producing everything from consumer goods to dura- 
bles to high-tech products. 
By any measure, China’s record in attracting capital flows is impressive. 
Here it is necessary to look further at some of the characteristics underlying 
these flows. One such characteristic is the large absolute amount of flows, up 
to $57 billion in 1995 alone and $43 billion in 1996, of which private flows 
accounted for 86.1 and 95.8 percent, respectively. Capital flows are primarily 
FDI. Portfolio flows (5.7 percent in 1995 and 9.6 percent in 1996) are a small 
share of the total, as are official flows, which accounted for less than $8 billion 
in 1995 and less than $2 billion in 1996. Another characteristic of China’s capi- 
tal flows is their high concentration, both in terms of investor origin and geo- 
graphic destination. Twelve coastal areas accounted for over 90 percent, some 
60 percent came from Hong Kong, and the top ten sources provided over 95 
percent of all flows to China. And, finally, there was a gradual opening-up. 
This cautious approach applies to both economic sectors and geographic re- 
gions. China conducted a localized experiment before extending nationwide. 
How China Managed These Large Flows 
Normally, we know that with sustained large inflows, one tends to experi- 
ence several macroeconomic effects, for example, expansion of the domestic 
money supply, upward pressure on prices and exchange rates, and widening of 
current account imbalances. 
When looking at China since 1990, however, it appears that except for 1993 
current accounts have remained positive throughout; price increases have been 
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moderate (apart from the period 1993-94) or lately decelerating. Indeed, the 
latest figures for September 1997 showed practically zero inflation, and the eco- 
nomic growth rate, on average, was high, ranging from 9.5 to over 12 percent. 
In short, there was little sign of the kind of instability in the domestic finan- 
cial system commonly associated with large inflows. The question to ask, 
therefore, is why. A quick answer is that the Chinese have managed well under 
the circumstances. Among others, the following examples are noteworthy. 
The Chinese pursued parallel policies of domestic monetary contraction, 
primarily through controls on aggregate credit. Specifically, the central bank 
managed to offset the increase in domestic money supply needed to absorb the 
inflows by reducing the credit available to domestic financial institutions and 
the government. Although nominal exchange rates remained more or less un- 
changed during the period, real effective exchange rates did appreciate sub- 
stantially-by some accounts, over 25 percent from 1992. This appreciation, 
one would argue, helped to bring the trade balance to a more sustainable level 
in face of the large capital inflows. 
In contrast to monetary policy, fiscal policy was not actively used; the gov- 
ernment deficit level remained fairly stable. However, by controlling or con- 
straining fixed capital investments, indeed by not increasing the deficit, fiscal 
policy played an effective supportive role in not putting additional pressure on 
the money supply. 
Furthermore, China kept the domestic financial system insulated from these 
inflows by various means. A limitation was set on the entry of foreign banks 
and their engagement in local currency transactions both in nature and volume. 
China established surrender requirements and convertibility restrictions on the 
foreign currency transactions of domestic financial institutions. It also estab- 
lished separate categories of ordinary shares for foreign and domestic inves- 
tors, and restrictions against foreign participation in domestic fixed income 
security markets. Unlike for current account transactions, all income from cap- 
ital account transactions must be maintained in foreign-currency-denominated 
accounts and cannot be converted into domestic currency without permission. 
Hence, the related impact on the domestic money supply is thereby minimized. 
Of course, these restrictions had a cost in terms of economic efficiency: the 
point is that their intended purpose seemed to have been well achieved. 
China adopted targeted incentive policies for FDI, putting the country’s ad- 
vantages to effective use. Incentives include a large market size, high economic 
growth, low production cost, competitive skilled labor, continued social stabil- 
ity, and a strong government with clear development objectives. 
The result is that four out of every five dollars that flowed into China were 
in the form of FDI, and a large part of them were in turn spent on buying 
foreign rather than domestic goods, mainly machinery. This perhaps explains 
why, although from 1992 to 1996 cumulative inflows totaled some $165 bil- 
lion, net foreign assets in the central bank and deposit money banks increased 
only by $70 billion. 
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The Challenges China Still Faces 
The fact that you have done well does not guarantee that you will continue 
to do well, although admittedly it does help in terms of having had a successful 
experience and laid a necessary foundation. In China, while there is certainly 
no more debate about the necessity and usefulness of capital inflows, success 
itself has created its own problems and led to debate about them. A typical 
debate relates to the emerging dominance of foreign products in an increasing 
number of industries or sectors. As I and my colleagues in the World Bank see 
it, China will have to handle several important issues well if it is to continue to 
be successful in attracting capital flows and putting them to good use. 
First, China will have to sustain strong macroeconomic performance 
through necessary reforms. One such reform would ensure continuation of bal- 
anced macropolicies by proceeding with effective state-owned enterprise re- 
forms and financial sector reforms consistent with the government’s regulatory 
and institutional capacities. The government will need to move to the right and 
strengthen its appropriate role in a growing market economy. China must 
achieve full convertibility of the domestic currency and create a level playing 
field for all, including foreign investors. In a way, China will have to place less 
emphasis on granting financial incentives to individual ventures and more on 
providing opportunities for global integration. 
Second, China must strive for a more desirable distribution of capital flows, 
both geographically (more to the interior) and sectorally (more to some ser- 
vice sectors, retailing, banking, insurance, etc.). Here more innovative and 
original ideas will be needed concerning financial incentives, market access, 
majority ownership, and so forth. The issues of cascading from coastal to inter- 
nal regions should also be investigated further given the complementary advan- 
tages of existing endowments and differential levels of development. 
Third, China must increase the diversity of FDI sources-not so much to 
reduce flows from Hong Kong, Macau, and other Chinese-based sources as to 
increase flows from other sources. The result would be that as China integrates 
more with the world, capital flows would be on a more sustainable path and 
generate more of the expected benefits, such as global production, marketing 
links, and introduction of advanced technologies, as well as managerial prac- 
tices. 
To conclude, China has done extremely well in attracting and managing capital 
inflows, even allowing for its unique and distinct advantages. However, to con- 
tinue to do well China faces challenges, not the least of which is the need to 
learn how to manage in an increasingly open and volatile environment, both in 
terms of regulatory infrastructure and institutional capacity. But prospects are 
encouraging, judging both from the government’s recent policy indications and 
the evolving economic generation of educated Chinese who have come back 
from abroad or are expected to come back. 
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5. Masaru Yoshitomi 
I am not a practitioner, or an academic expert, but I am somewhat concerned 
with the Asian financial crisis. I am now teaching at the Wharton School at the 
University of Pennsylvania. At the same time, however, I wear another hat, that 
of the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan. My bank is in trouble not only because 
of its large domestic nonperforming assets but also because of its heavier in- 
volvement in the banking crisis in Asia. 
First, in discussing the banking and currency crises in Asia, many commen- 
tators stress that the engine of growth behind the Asian miracle has suddenly 
stopped. That is, in 1996 the growth rate of exports in many Asian countries, 
including China, slowed to just around 2 percent, and in the case of Thailand, 
down to - 1.5 percent or so. Until 1995, export growth had been around 15 to 
20 percent for most Asian countries. What, then, initiated this decline in ex- 
ports? There are two schools of thought. 
One school emphasizes the adverse effects of the Chinese currency devalua- 
tion in early 1994, up to 35 percent with regard to its official exchange rate. 
Because Thai exports compete with exports from China and other Asian coun- 
tries in the same category of products, Thailand’s failure to upgrade its export 
structure is a basic reason its engine of growth stopped, this school claims. 
The other school of thought claims that the loss of international competitive- 
ness is due to the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar, 
despite the strong appreciation of the U.S. dollar in 1996-97 on top of high 
inflation in Asian countries. Asian currencies became overvalued, depressing 
exports and encouraging imports. 
In this context, however, I cannot erase my memory of April 1995, just after 
the peso crisis, when my bank organized a seminar at Pataya Beach near Bang- 
kok, inviting central bankers and officers from the treasury to discuss currency 
issues. The main concern at that time was the extraordinary appreciation of the 
yen against the U.S. dollar (up to 80 yen per dollar) and the weak dollar. The 
major complaint was the wide fluctuations of the exchange rate between these 
two major currencies. The Thai authorities didn’t like seeing the two elephants 
dancing on their delicate grass. 
Today in 1997, in sharp contrast, we hear that the fixing of the Thai baht to 
a strong U.S. dollar resulted in a large overvaluation that hurt Thai exports. 
But in 1996, the annual average exchange rate of the yen was 108 yen per dol- 
lar. Exchange rates of 100 to 110 yen per dollar are a reasonable zone for pur- 
chasing power parity in the tradable sector in Japan. Only in 1997 has the yen 
deviated from that sort of equilibrium exchange rate. In other words, though 
the yen depreciated sharply against the U.S. dollar in 1996, it was from the 
extraordinary overvaluation of the yen in 1995, and the level of the yen-dollar 
exchange rate in 1996 was quite normal. Nevertheless, Thai exports performed 
very poorly that year. Therefore, I cannot figure out how in such a short time 
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Thailand and other Asian countries suffered from the stalling of their engine 
of growth. At the same time, if Thailand had adopted a floating exchange rate 
in the context of its excessive capital inflows, which substantially exceeded 
the current account deficits in preceding years, then the Thai baht would have 
appreciated considerably. Such an appreciation could be interpreted as short- 
run overshooting, but in light of the excessive capital inflows for several years, 
the consequence could have been a prolonged misalignment in the exchange 
rate. Such a misaligned exchange rate could have imposed another difficult 
problem on the Thai authorities. 
Furthermore, as you know, the Thai economy is still in an early stage of de- 
velopment, and therefore, its financial markets are not well developed. A float- 
ing regime under massive international capital movements can result in ex- 
treme gyrations in the exchange rate. The shallowness of the Thai financial 
market could not have coped with the volatility of international capital flows. 
In 1994-95, when the Mexican peso crisis took place, we all discussed 
whether a contagious run could hit the Thai baht. Many people, including those 
at the IMF and the World Bank, concluded that all Thailand’s macroeconomic 
fundamentals were quite good: low inflation, a balanced budget, a high saving 
rate, and a high potential growth rate. Inflation may have been accelerating, 
but from 5 percent to at most 7 percent. So we were satisfied with the stability 
of the baht. 
Only two years later, we confront a banking crisis and currency crisis in 
Thailand and other Asian economies. Something new must have happened af- 
ter early 1995, or must have already been happening around 1995, when we got 
together at Pataya Beach. 
One such change occurred in the composition of international capital in- 
flows to Thailand, which shifted from foreign direct investment to international 
bank credit. That is, short-term international bank loans became dominant in 
capital inflows. This shift was related to the fixed exchange rate, which had 
been maintained more than a decade, long enough for investors to forget the 
foreign exchange risk. Very few people were actually skeptical about the fixity 
of the exchange rate between the Thai baht and the U.S. dollar. The dollar in- 
terest rate was around 5 to 6 percent, and the baht interest rate was around 12 to 
13 percent. Local financial institutions enjoyed this large interest rate differen- 
tial, given the fixed exchange rate. 
The other such change, one we did not recognize at the time, occurred in 
how and where international bank loans were being used. We only looked at 
the macroeconomic fundamentals and paid less attention to the sectoral alloca- 
tion of domestic credit, the aggregate of which was increasing rapidly because 
of the massive inflow of international bank loans. Much more important, how- 
ever, domestic credit to the real estate sector was expanding most rapidly. (This 
was also the case in Japan in the 1980s. I was in charge of macroeconomic 
policy in the Japanese government, and we paid a lot of attention to the funda- 
mentals. The growth rate of the Japanese economy was 5.5 percent. The infla- 
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tion rate was only 1.5 percent. Innovation was going on in microelectronics. 
The key policy issue was how to reduce Japan’s external surplus. The continued 
good macroeconomic fundamentals may have produced a sort of euphoria. But 
in the midst of it, very few people could recognize that it was euphoria and a 
bubble. There were available many theoretical and empirical justifications for 
such optimism during the bubble period.) 
At the same time, the Thai external deficit was widening in 1995-96. I had 
already warned at the Pataya Beach meeting that the external deficit was ap- 
proaching 6 to 7 percent of GDP, more half of which was financed by interna- 
tional bank loans. Earlier in the 1990s, however, net capital inflows substan- 
tially exceeded the current account deficits. The resultant increases in foreign 
reserves and hence in the money supply-that is, excess domestic demand- 
produced increasing external deficits rather than higher domestic inflation, 
since the latter did not accelerate much. In other words, the excess net capital 
inflows caused the current account deficit to increase, rather than simply fi- 
nancing the increased external deficit. This issue requires deeper analysis. 
The next question is whether the current account deficit mattered or not. 
The Thai current account deficit eventually accounted for 8 percent of GDP in 
1995-96. Malaysia had an external deficit of similar magnitude, but it did not 
trigger a crisis. The Indonesian current account deficit was less than 4 percent 
of GDP, just half of the level in Thailand, but similar to the level in the Philip- 
pines. The current account deficit may not have mattered much, but what did 
matter was how the deficit was financed. This is because what made possible 
the sudden reversal from capital inflow to outflow, which should account for 
the suddenness of the currency depreciation, must depend on the characteris- 
tics of the capital inflow. Another important question is, What triggered such a 
reversal? A domestic banking crisis apparently triggered it. 
Thus we come to the need to analyze the nature of banking crises. Over the 
past 10 to 15 years we have had banking crises in every country in the world. 
I was talking with George Kaufman in Chicago just a few weeks ago. When I 
said, “Every country has experienced a banking crisis these days,” he said, no. 
He showed me a map produced by the IMF, published in 1996. Kaufman con- 
tinued, “Here in these areas we have not had a banking crisis yet.” Such areas 
were colored white on the map. “In the white colored areas, they don’t have 
banks yet,” he laughed. 
Every country that has implemented financial liberalization has experienced 
a banking crisis, so that many analysts now claim that banking crises must be 
related to financial liberalization. In Thailand, the offshore market opened in 
1993. Japanese banks, including my bank, were attracted to the offshore mar- 
ket because the Thai authorities promised to give foreign banks full banking 
licenses if they showed good performance, that is, extended a large amount of 
international credit in the offshore market. The offshore market in turn lent to 
local banks and finance companies, which were heavily engaged in lending to 
the real estate market. 
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The excess supply of domestic bank credit did not seriously accelerate do- 
mestic inflation in the general market of goods and services but instead fueled 
inflation mainly in the asset markets, particularly in real estate. This indicates 
that the sectoral allocation of bank credit is much more important than the 
monetary aggregate of either total bank credit or the money supply. (This prob- 
lem happened in Japan in the 1980s. The aggregate money supply was indeed 
somewhat excessive, but the magnitude of that excess could not account for 
the tripling or quadrupling of asset prices in the decade.) What accounts for 
this kind of sectoral concentration of the extension of bank loans? That is a 
difficult question. In general, we can say that their declining franchise, in the 
face of financial liberalization and tougher competition from nonbanks, forced 
the banks to find new outlets. For example, demand for bank credit declined 
on the part of large borrowers, who could rely on the liberalized capital market 
in addition to greater self-financing of their business investment through re- 
tained income. 
In particular, in the case of Thailand, banking behavior in the 1990s should 
be analyzed more carefully. The key issues are whether ex ante monitoring was 
done well by the banks, particularly in order to avoid adverse selection, and 
whether the banks monitored borrowers once loans were extended, in order to 
avoid moral hazard on the part of the borrowers. 
We often emphasize that when we liberalize financial markets, we should at 
the same time improve prudential measures and supervision of banks, that is, 
improve the regulatory framework within which financial institutions operate. 
Prompt corrective action (PCA) centering on capital ratio regulations is a key. 
Here we have some difficulty, however. Why do we need rule-based rather 
than discretion-based bank regulations? PCA can avoid the moral hazard of 
near insolvent banks, but only after the bursting of a bubble. Such moral hazard 
takes the form of offering higher interest rates on deposits to invest in riskier 
projects, to gain extra profits for writing off nonperforming assets, given the 
deposit insurance scheme. Also, the authorities are engaged in “forbearance 
policy.” To avoid those two serious problems, moral hazard and forbearance 
policy, we should introduce PCA. The purpose of this rule-based measure is to 
close down potentially insolvent institutions as early as possible while they 
still hold positive capital, so as to minimize the expenditure of public money, 
which after all comes from taxes levied on the public. Public money must be 
used if necessary to bail out depositors but not to support insolvent institutions. 
However, a big question is whether PCA can prevent a bubble from taking 
place rather than simply preventing moral hazard and forbearance policy after 
the bursting of the bubble. It may be very difficult to prevent a bubble from 
being generated using the bank’s capital ratios, because capital ratios move in 
a procyclical manner. 
To sum up, the currency and banking crises in Asia should be analyzed from 
the following three economic policy angles: 
1. How can we get exchange rate policy right in the face of massive capital 
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flows? Asian countries wanted to keep international price competitiveness, by 
fixing their exchange rates with the dollar. Over the past ten, fifteen, or twenty 
years, the dollar has continued to depreciate against the yen; therefore, by fix- 
ing to the dollar, the Asian economies were able to maintain reasonably good 
competitiveness. So it must have been very difficult for them to switch the 
currency basket by changing the weight between the U.S. dollar and yen or to 
switch from a fixed to a floating regime. The question is when they could have 
switched in an orderly manner, particularly in the context of shifts in the com- 
position, size, and speed of international capital movements. 
2. How can we get banking behavior right under the protection of deposits? 
We can talk about prudential measures and regulatory frameworks, but after 
all, it is very difficult to classify bank loans according to credit risk due to the 
nature of bank credit. It remains very difficult to evaluate bank credit risks and 
hence to securitize bank credit. It could be done by using credit derivatives, 
but that is still limited. 
3. How can we counteract the financial-cum-real estate cycle? This is the 
hardest area to analyze. We do not have enough knowledge about what causes 
this cycle and how to stem such a cycle in the future. Moreover, it remains very 
difficult, in the midst of euphoria, to identify a bubble as such. 
Finally, the critical question is what kind of policy package can cope with 
“twin” financial crises-for example, the currency crisis and banking crisis 
that have been reinforcing each other in the Asian countries. Current IMF pack- 
ages may not be sufficient, as indicated by the continued depreciation of the 
Asian currencies, even after the packages were announced. We have to see 
whether the IMF packages can take care of both banking and currency crises 
effectively and simultaneously, without high cost to Asian economies. 
Discussion Summary 
Takatoshi Zto observed that China is generating both a sizable current account 
surplus and sizable capital inflows resulting in the rapid accumulation of for- 
eign reserves. He wondered whether this is a conscious strategy and if the 
currency would be allowed to appreciate ultimately. Paul Krugrnan concurred, 
suggesting that this combination results in the recycling of capital inflows and, 
consequently, these flows are not financing domestic economic growth. Krug- 
man characterized this as a precautionary macroeconomic policy but a curious 
developmental policy. 
Zhang Shengrnan said this policy of accumulating reserves reflects an over- 
all conservative economic approach by the Chinese. He suggested that reserves 
would reach approximately $140 billion by the end of the year, and he forecast 
a continued increase, although at a less dramatic pace. This reduced pace 
would be a function of reduced inflows following the removal of import duties, 
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a slight loosening of monetary policy, policy changes required prior to mem- 
bership in the World Trade Organization, and some signs of increasing out- 
flows. He also noted that existing debt of $130 billion reduces the magnitude 
of the reserves. 
It0 inquired about the health of the Chinese banking system. Some indica- 
tors seem stable while others show possible trouble ahead. Given the centrality 
of the banking sector to other crises, he asked about the specifics of the Chi- 
nese situation. 
Zhang replied that this question is related to the overall issue of how to 
handle state-owned enterprises. While the economics of this situation are well 
understood, the implementation issues regarding employment and social impli- 
cations provide a number of difficulties. He noted that four of the largest state- 
owned banks have nonperforming loan ratios of approximately 20 percent. The 
current policy response is to strengthen prudential discipline and to address the 
quality of state-owned enterprises directly. While there are over 350,000 state- 
owned enterprises in China, 1,000 enterprises account for 70 percent of their 
combined asset value. Focusing on the largest state-owned enterprises will al- 
low for a gradual resolution of these difficulties. 
James Hines asked why the Chinese government is worried about the geo- 
graphic and sectoral concentration of foreign direct investment. Furthermore, 
he noted that any fiscal incentives to stimulate diversification may have signif- 
icant efficiency consequences. Robert Lipsey inquired about the character of 
the huge foreign direct investment flows to China. In particular, given the im- 
portance of Hong Kong as a source, he asked about the magnitude of roundtrip- 
ping flows that actually originate in China. More generally, he inquired about 
the nature of the flows from Hong Kong given their large size. 
Zhang replied that the effort to guide foreign direct investment is equivalent 
to leveling the playing field. He noted that coastal areas had initially attracted 
flows through preferential treatment. Furthermore, transportation costs are ex- 
tremely high for the westernmost parts of China, suggesting that incentives and 
infrastructure will be needed to guide foreign direct investment there. Martin 
Feldstein suggested that guidance to such regions may introduce the distor- 
tions alluded to by Hines. Zhang also noted that current estimates of the magni- 
tude of roundtripping are at approximately 15 percent of inflows. Furthermore, 
the fact that Hong Kong provides 60 percent of all inflows reflects investment 
channeled through foreign subsidiaries based in Hong Kong and investment 
originating in Taiwan. 
Kathryn Dominguez questioned the rationale for an Asian regional fund. 
Noting that Argentina had not averted a crisis with its currency board system 
of fully backed reserves, she suggested that the ability to resist a crisis is not a 
function of the amount of reserves a country has access to. Stanley Fischer 
further noted that the IMF has sufficient reserves and that a regional fund may 
not be able to enforce the same level of conditionality rendered by the IMF. 
Moeen Qureshi replied that the rationale for a regional fund is twofold. First, 
a regional fund would allow access to more reserves. Second, a regional fund 
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would address the perception that the political decision-making process of the 
IMF is still dominated by two or three countries and, consequently, does not 
reflect the fact that some Asian countries have come of age. Furthermore, he 
suggested that Japan, within the context of an Asian regional fund, would en- 
force conditionality terms that are as stringent as those of the IMF. 
Zto emphasized the moral hazard lessons of these currency crises. In particu- 
lar, he inquired about the potential consequences if the Mexican government 
had forced involuntary rollover of the Tesobonos or if the Thai government had 
forced finance companies to default on their obligations. Such punishment of 
investors that search for yield may serve to avert such crises in the future. 
Masaru Yoshitomi responded that these questions are related to the validity 
of the too-big-to-fail doctrine. While punishing selective investors may be at- 
tractive, the systemic nature of these financial-real estate crises makes selec- 
tive punishment difficult and introduces systemic risks. Moreover, given the 
euphoria and irrationality associated with these bubbles, he was sympathetic 
with the use of the too-big-to-fail doctrine. 
Krugman noted that the absence of a forward discount on the Thai baht un- 
til May suggested that there was a great deal of irrationality as investors en- 
tered the market. As such, the irrationality was more pronounced during the 
entry of these investors in markets rather than on their departure. Krugman 
further noted that the real consequences of these bubbles present a significant 
challenge to the economics profession because no good macroeconomic mod- 
els exist of the implications of a financial bubble on the real economy. 
Arminio Fraga concurred that irrational behavior characterizes entry into a 
bubble and that such financial bubbles have real consequences. Furthermore, 
he noted that in many cases adjustment to reality happens in an instant with 
the arrival of information on government policy responses. For example, the 
Thai policy response to the growing crisis disturbed many investors and led to 
the disorderly depreciation. Fraga further noted that the Indonesian case was 
interesting in this vein because it felt like a real run. Feldstein responded that 
the high level of external debt may have accounted for the actions of investors. 
Fraga noted that the composition of the debt was weighted toward exporters 
and that much of the economy was still relatively healthy. 
It0 suggested that the Thai and Mexican crises were distinct in an important 
way. In the case of Mexico, he argued, many investors were surprised by the 
devaluation and the banking crisis followed the currency crisis. In contrast, It0 
characterized the Thai situation as one where the devaluation was expected 
and the financial sector crisis precipitated the currency crisis. 
Sebastian Edwards disagreed with this characterization, suggesting that 
weakness in the banking sector in Mexico was apparent as early as 1992. 
Moreover, weakness in the domestic financial sector led to the issuance of the 
Tesobonos, which aggravated the situation and ultimate crisis. Francisco Gil 
Diaz concurred with Edwards and noted that the banking crisis was apparent 
prior to the exchange rate crisis. He noted that the distinction between which 
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investors-Mexican or foreign-took money out during the crisis was a du- 
bious one. In fact, many nationals were holders of Brady bonds, malung any 
study of which investors deepened the crisis inconclusive. Feldstein noted, how- 
ever, that the evidence is that the Mexican equity markets moved before the 
New York markets, suggesting that Mexican investors may have moved first. 
Qureshi reiterated his conclusion that floating exchange rates create domes- 
tic pressures on politicians that can, in turn, create other distortions. For ex- 
ample, floating exchange rates create demand for subsidies from exposed sec- 
tors and employees who are not protected by the exchange rate regime. He also 
noted that the emphasis on the financial sector in these crises may not always 
be appropriate or distinct from sound macroeconomic policy. Krugman con- 
curred, noting that both the U.S. savings and loan crisis and the Thai experi- 
ence with finance companies can be characterized as covert fiscal expansions 
rather than as examples of poor oversight of financial systems. Qureshi also 
distinguished the experience of Thailand, which was a classic IMF case, from 
the experience of Indonesia and Malaysia, where political dimensions were 
magnifying smaller macroeconomic problems. 
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